Stateless and I stumbled upon this issue while discussing the
semantics of read, accepting a size_t but only being able to return
ssize_t, effectively lacking the ability to report successful
reads > SSIZE_MAX.
The discussion went along and we came to the topic of input-based
memory allocations. Basically, it was possible for the argument
to a memory-allocation-function to overflow, leading to a segfault
later.
The OpenBSD-guys came up with the ingenious reallocarray-function,
and I implemented it as ereallocarray, which automatically returns
on error.
Read more about it here[0].
A simple testcase is this (courtesy to stateless):
$ sbase-strings -n (2^(32|64) / 4)
This will segfault before this patch and properly return an OOM-
situation afterwards (thanks to the overflow-check in reallocarray).
[0]: http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi/OpenBSD-current/man3/calloc.3
Previously, the string-length was limited to BUFSIZ, which is an
obvious deficiency.
Now the buffer only needs to be as long as the user specifies the
minimal string length.
I added UTF-8-support, because that's how POSIX wants it and there
are cases where you need this. It doesn't add ELF-barf compared to
the previous implementation.
The t-flag is also pretty important for POSIX-compliance, so I added
it.
The only trouble previously was the a-flag, but given that POSIX
leaves undefined what the a-flag actually does, we set it as default
and don't care about parsing ELF-headers, which has already
turned out to be a security issue in GNU coreutils[0].
[0]: http://lcamtuf.blogspot.ro/2014/10/psa-dont-run-strings-on-untrusted-files.html
FRIGN
sin