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humanacollaborator 2021-03-06 15:36:06 -05:00
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gitlab-dot-com.md
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@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ consequently [FSF criteria C3][fsfCriteria] is unmet.
gitlab.com, so they have a hand in the oppression of their own gitlab.com, so they have a hand in the oppression of their own
contributors). contributors).
-----
Regarding the last item above, a user was simply trying to edit an Regarding the last item above, a user was simply trying to edit an
existing message that they had already posted and a CAPTCHA was forced existing message that they had already posted and a CAPTCHA was forced
on them. There are several problems with gitlab.com's rampant abuse on them. There are several problems with gitlab.com's rampant abuse
@ -103,12 +104,12 @@ of CAPTCHAs:
work for humans. The fruits of the human labor does not go to the work for humans. The fruits of the human labor does not go to the
laborer, but instead hCAPTCHA [pays][cfpaid] CloudFlare a cash laborer, but instead hCAPTCHA [pays][cfpaid] CloudFlare a cash
reward. Consequently the laborers benefit their oppressor. reward. Consequently the laborers benefit their oppressor.
1. CAPTCHAs are defeated. Spammers find it economical to use 1. CAPTCHAs are defeated. Spammers find it economical to use
third-world sweat shop labor for CAPTCHAs while legitimate users third-world sweat shop labor for CAPTCHAs while legitimate users
have this burden of dealing with CAPTCHAs that are often broken. have this burden of dealing with CAPTCHAs that are often broken.
1. hCAPTCHAs compromise security as a consequence of surveillance 1. hCAPTCHAs compromise security as a consequence of surveillance
capitalism that entails collection of IP address and browser capitalism that entails collection of IP address and browser
print. print.
* anonymity is [compromised][grcDenanymises] (the article covers * anonymity is [compromised][grcDenanymises] (the article covers
reCAPTCHA but hCAPTCHA is vulnerable for the same reasons). reCAPTCHA but hCAPTCHA is vulnerable for the same reasons).
* the third-party javascript that hCAPTCHA executes could linger * the third-party javascript that hCAPTCHA executes could linger
@ -163,9 +164,10 @@ of CAPTCHAs:
</tbody> </tbody>
</table> </table>
</details> </details>
1. Users are forced to execute [non-free javascript][nonfreejs], 1. Users are forced to execute [non-free javascript][nonfreejs], thus
thus violating [FSF criteria C0.0][fsfCriteria]. violating [FSF criteria C0.0][fsfCriteria].
1. The CAPTCHA requires a GUI, thus denying service to users of text-based clients including the `git` command. 1. The CAPTCHA requires a GUI, thus denying service to users of
text-based clients including the `git` command.
1. The CAPTCHAs are often broken. This amounts to a denial of service: 1. The CAPTCHAs are often broken. This amounts to a denial of service:
* E.g.1: the CAPTCHA server itself refuses to give the puzzle saying there is too much activity. * E.g.1: the CAPTCHA server itself refuses to give the puzzle saying there is too much activity.
* E.g.2: gitlab.com has switched back and forth between Google's reCAPTCHA and hCAPTCHA (by *Intuition Machines, Inc.*) but at the moment they've settled on hCAPTCHA. Both have broken and both default to access denial in that event: <table> * E.g.2: gitlab.com has switched back and forth between Google's reCAPTCHA and hCAPTCHA (by *Intuition Machines, Inc.*) but at the moment they've settled on hCAPTCHA. Both have broken and both default to access denial in that event: <table>