Change the strip_exif logic to work with the already existing OpenBSD sandbox and allow ffmpeg and mogrify to be executed. The previous strip_exif implementation relied on system(3), effectively starting "/bin/sh" and executing the required tool within a shell session. Making this work in the sandbox would require to allow executing "/bin/sh", rendering the sandbox useless. Thus, the code now starts determining the absolute path of the tools - unless they are given as ffmpeg_path or mogrify_path - and allowing them to be executed via unveil(2). Then, instead of the system(3) call, the good old fork(2) and execve(2) dance is performed. The sbox_enter code was made aware of strip_exif, which resulted in a pledge(2) violation before when disable_email_notifications was set to false. Furthermore, the detected paths of the tools are now allowed.
175 lines
4.8 KiB
C
175 lines
4.8 KiB
C
#include "xs.h"
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#include "snac.h"
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#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
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void sbox_enter(const char *basedir)
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{
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const char *address = xs_dict_get(srv_config, "address");
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if (xs_is_true(xs_dict_get(srv_config, "disable_openbsd_security"))) {
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srv_log(xs_dup("OpenBSD security disabled by admin"));
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return;
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}
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const xs_val *strip_exif = xs_dict_get(srv_config, "strip_exif");
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int smail;
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const char *url = xs_dict_get(srv_config, "smtp_url");
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if (xs_is_string(url) && *url)
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smail = 0;
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else
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smail = !xs_is_true(xs_dict_get(srv_config, "disable_email_notifications"));
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srv_debug(1, xs_fmt("Calling unveil()"));
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unveil(basedir, "rwc");
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unveil("/tmp", "rwc");
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unveil("/etc/resolv.conf", "r");
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unveil("/etc/hosts", "r");
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unveil("/etc/ssl/openssl.cnf", "r");
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unveil("/etc/ssl/cert.pem", "r");
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unveil("/usr/share/zoneinfo", "r");
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if (*address == '/')
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unveil(address, "rwc");
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if (strip_exif) {
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unveil(xs_dict_get(srv_config, "ffmpeg_path"), "x");
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unveil(xs_dict_get(srv_config, "mogrify_path"), "x");
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}
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if (smail)
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unveil("/usr/sbin/sendmail", "x");
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unveil(NULL, NULL);
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srv_debug(1, xs_fmt("Calling pledge()"));
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xs *p = xs_str_new("stdio rpath wpath cpath flock inet proc dns fattr");
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if (*address == '/')
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p = xs_str_cat(p, " unix");
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if (smail || strip_exif)
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p = xs_str_cat(p, " exec");
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pledge(p, NULL);
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}
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#elif defined(__linux__)
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#if defined(WITH_LINUX_SANDBOX)
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#include <unistd.h>
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#define LL_PRINTERR(fmt, ...) srv_debug(0, xs_fmt(fmt, __VA_ARGS__))
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#include "landloc.h"
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static
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LL_BEGIN(sbox_enter_linux_, const char* basedir, const char *address, int smtp_port) {
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const unsigned long long
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rd = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR,
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rf = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
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w = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
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LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE_COMPAT,
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c = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR |
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LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG |
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LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE_COMPAT |
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LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM |
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LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR |
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LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE |
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LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER_COMPAT,
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s = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK,
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x = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE;
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char *resolved_path = NULL;
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LL_PATH(basedir, rf|rd|w|c);
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LL_PATH("/tmp", rf|rd|w|c);
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#ifndef WITHOUT_SHM
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LL_PATH("/dev/shm", rf|w|c );
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#endif
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LL_PATH("/dev/urandom", rf );
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LL_PATH("/etc/resolv.conf", rf );
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LL_PATH("/etc/hosts", rf );
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LL_PATH("/etc/ssl", rf|rd );
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if ((resolved_path = realpath("/etc/ssl/cert.pem", NULL))) {
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/* some distros like cert.pem to be a symlink */
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LL_PATH(resolved_path, rf );
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free(resolved_path);
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}
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LL_PATH("/usr/share/zoneinfo", rf );
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if (mtime("/etc/pki") > 0)
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LL_PATH("/etc/pki", rf );
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if (*address == '/') {
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/* the directory holding the socket must be allowed */
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xs *l = xs_split(address, "/");
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l = xs_list_del(l, -1);
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xs *sdir = xs_join(l, "/");
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LL_PATH(sdir, s);
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}
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if (*address != '/') {
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unsigned short listen_port = xs_number_get(xs_dict_get(srv_config, "port"));
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LL_PORT(listen_port, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP_COMPAT);
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}
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LL_PORT(80, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP_COMPAT);
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LL_PORT(443, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP_COMPAT);
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if (smtp_port > 0)
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LL_PORT((unsigned short)smtp_port, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP_COMPAT);
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} LL_END
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void sbox_enter(const char *basedir)
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{
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const char *errstr;
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const char *address = xs_dict_get(srv_config, "address");
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const char *smtp_url = xs_dict_get(srv_config, "smtp_url");
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int smtp_port = -1;
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if (xs_is_true(xs_dict_get(srv_config, "disable_sandbox"))) {
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srv_debug(1, xs_dup("Linux sandbox disabled by admin"));
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return;
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}
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if (xs_is_string(smtp_url) && *smtp_url != '\0') {
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smtp_port = parse_port(smtp_url, &errstr);
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if (errstr)
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srv_debug(0, xs_fmt("Couldn't determine port from '%s': %s", smtp_url, errstr));
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}
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if (sbox_enter_linux_(basedir, address, smtp_port) == 0)
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srv_debug(1, xs_dup("Linux sandbox enabled"));
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else
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srv_debug(0, xs_dup("Linux sandbox failed"));
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}
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#else /* defined(WITH_LINUX_SANDBOX) */
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void sbox_enter(const char *basedir)
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{
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(void)basedir;
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srv_debug(1, xs_fmt("Linux sandbox not compiled in"));
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}
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#endif
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#else
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/* other OSs: dummy sbox_enter() */
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void sbox_enter(const char *basedir)
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{
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(void)basedir;
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}
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#endif /* __OpenBSD__ */
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