openbsd-ports/print/gv/patches/patch-source_file_h

$OpenBSD: patch-source_file_h,v 1.1 2002/10/04 18:29:14 brad Exp $
--- source/file.h.orig	Fri Apr 25 18:00:00 1997
+++ source/file.h	Fri Oct  4 14:20:31 2002
@@ -70,6 +70,14 @@ extern int			file_fileIsNotUseful (
 #endif
 );
 
+extern char *file_charsAllowedInName;
+
+extern int			file_nameIsDangerous (
+#if NeedFunctionPrototypes
+   char *
+#endif
+);
+
 extern char*			file_pdfname2psname (
 #if NeedFunctionPrototypes
    char *	/* name */
Fix security issue with gv. When GV detects that the document is either a PDF file or a GZip compressed file, it executes some commands with the help of the system() function. Unfortunately, these commands contain the filename, which can be considered as untrusted user input. It is then possible to distribute a file (with a meticulously chosen filename, that even seems innocent) that causes execution of arbitrary shell commands when it is read with GV. http://www.epita.fr/~bevand_m/asa/asa-0000 2002-10-04 14:29:14 -04:00			$OpenBSD: patch-source_file_h,v 1.1 2002/10/04 18:29:14 brad Exp $
			`--- source/file.h.orig Fri Apr 25 18:00:00 1997`
			`+++ source/file.h Fri Oct 4 14:20:31 2002`
			`@@ -70,6 +70,14 @@ extern int file_fileIsNotUseful (`
			`#endif`
			`);`

			`+extern char *file_charsAllowedInName;`
			`+`
			`+extern int file_nameIsDangerous (`
			`+#if NeedFunctionPrototypes`
			`+ char *`
			`+#endif`
			`+);`
			`+`
			`extern char* file_pdfname2psname (`
			`#if NeedFunctionPrototypes`
			`char * /* name */`