Fix security issue with gv.

When GV detects that the document is either a PDF file or a
GZip compressed file, it executes some commands with the help of the
system() function. Unfortunately, these commands contain the
filename, which can be considered as untrusted user input. It is then
possible to distribute a file (with a meticulously chosen filename,
that even seems innocent) that causes execution of arbitrary
shell commands when it is read with GV.

http://www.epita.fr/~bevand_m/asa/asa-0000

print/gv/Makefile

@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.17 2001/11/13 22:13:24 espie Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.18 2002/10/04 18:29:14 brad Exp $
 
 COMMENT= 	"PostScript and PDF previewer"
 
 DISTNAME=	gv-3.5.8
+PKGNAME=	${DISTNAME}p1
 CATEGORIES=	print
-NEED_VERSION=	1.496
 MASTER_SITES=	ftp://ftpthep.physik.uni-mainz.de/pub/gv/unix/
 
-
 # GPL
 PERMIT_PACKAGE_CDROM=	Yes
 PERMIT_PACKAGE_FTP=	Yes
@@ -17,7 +16,6 @@ PERMIT_DISTFILES_FTP=	Yes
 LIB_DEPENDS=	Xaw3d.6.1::x11/Xaw3d
 RUN_DEPENDS=	:ghostscript-*:print/ghostscript/gnu
 
-
 CONFIGURE_STYLE=	imake
 
 INSTALL_TARGET=install install.man install.doc

print/gv/patches/patch-source_file_c

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+$OpenBSD: patch-source_file_c,v 1.1 2002/10/04 18:29:14 brad Exp $
+--- source/file.c.orig	Fri Jun  6 18:00:00 1997
++++ source/file.c	Fri Oct  4 14:20:31 2002
+@@ -285,6 +285,22 @@ file_fileIsNotUseful(fn)
+ }
+ 
+ /*############################################################*/
++/* file_nameIsDangerous */
++/*############################################################*/
++
++char *file_charsAllowedInName = "+,-./:=@\\^_";
++
++int
++file_nameIsDangerous(fn)
++  char *fn;
++{
++  for (; *fn; fn++)
++    if (!isalnum(*fn) && !strchr(file_charsAllowedInName, *fn))
++      return(1);
++  return(0);
++}
++
++/*############################################################*/
+ /* file_pdfname2psname */
+ /* If the file ends in .pdf, change this to .ps.*/
+ /* Return pointer to temp copy if changed, else to input string. */

print/gv/patches/patch-source_file_h

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+$OpenBSD: patch-source_file_h,v 1.1 2002/10/04 18:29:14 brad Exp $
+--- source/file.h.orig	Fri Apr 25 18:00:00 1997
++++ source/file.h	Fri Oct  4 14:20:31 2002
+@@ -70,6 +70,14 @@ extern int			file_fileIsNotUseful (
+ #endif
+ );
+ 
++extern char *file_charsAllowedInName;
++
++extern int			file_nameIsDangerous (
++#if NeedFunctionPrototypes
++   char *
++#endif
++);
++
+ extern char*			file_pdfname2psname (
+ #if NeedFunctionPrototypes
+    char *	/* name */

print/gv/patches/patch-source_ps_c

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+$OpenBSD: patch-source_ps_c,v 1.1 2002/10/04 18:29:14 brad Exp $
+--- source/ps.c.orig	Fri Jun  6 18:00:00 1997
++++ source/ps.c	Fri Oct  4 14:20:31 2002
+@@ -420,6 +420,16 @@ psscan(fileP,filename,filename_raw,filen
+       char cmd[512];
+       char s[512];
+       filename_unc=file_getTmpFilename(NULL,filename_raw);
++      if (file_nameIsDangerous(filename))
++	{
++	  INFMESSAGE(the filename is dangerous)
++	  sprintf(s, "The filename \"%s\" is dangerous: only alphanumeric "
++		  "characters and \"%s\" are allowed.\n",
++		  filename, file_charsAllowedInName);
++	  NotePopupShowMessage(s);
++	  ENDMESSAGE(psscan)
++	  return(NULL);
++	}
+       sprintf(cmd,cmd_uncompress,filename,filename_unc);
+       INFMESSAGE(is compressed)
+       INFSMESSAGE(uncompress command,cmd)
+@@ -491,6 +501,16 @@ unc_ok:
+       char cmd[512];
+       char s[512];
+       filename_dsc=file_getTmpFilename(NULL,filename_raw);
++      if (file_nameIsDangerous(filename))
++	{
++	  INFMESSAGE(the filename is dangerous)
++	  sprintf(s, "The filename \"%s\" is dangerous: only alphanumeric "
++		  "characters and \"%s\" are allowed.\n",
++		  filename, file_charsAllowedInName);
++	  NotePopupShowMessage(s);
++	  ENDMESSAGE(psscan)
++	  return(NULL);
++	}
+       sprintf(cmd,cmd_scan_pdf,filename,filename_dsc);
+       INFMESSAGE(is PDF)
+       INFSMESSAGE(scan command,cmd)