Call stacks reported by valgrind:
==14702== at 0x80DD791: read_from_socket (socket.c:945)
==14702== by 0x8104D0C: read_more_http_data (http.c:1180)
==14702== by 0x81052FE: read_http_data (http.c:1388)
==14702== by 0x80DD69B: read_select (socket.c:910)
==14702== by 0x80D27AA: select_loop (select.c:307)
==14702== by 0x80D1ADE: main (main.c:358)
==14702== Address 0x4F4E598 is 56 bytes inside a block of size 81 free'd
==14702== at 0x402210F: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:233)
==14702== by 0x812BED8: debug_mem_free (memdebug.c:484)
==14702== by 0x80D7C82: done_connection (connection.c:479)
==14702== by 0x80D8A44: abort_connection (connection.c:769)
==14702== by 0x80D99CE: cancel_download (connection.c:1053)
==14702== by 0x8110EB6: abort_download (download.c:143)
==14702== by 0x81115BC: download_data_store (download.c:337)
==14702== by 0x8111AFB: download_data (download.c:446)
==14702== by 0x80D7B33: notify_connection_callbacks (connection.c:458)
==14702== by 0x80D781E: set_connection_state (connection.c:388)
==14702== by 0x80D7132: set_connection_socket_state (connection.c:234)
==14702== by 0x80DD78D: read_from_socket (socket.c:943)
read_from_socket() attempted to read socket->fd in order to set
handlers on it, but the socket had already been freed. Incidentally,
socket->fd was -1, which would have resulted in an assertion failure
if valgrind hadn't caught the bug first.
To fix this, add a list of weak references to sockets.
read_from_socket() registers a weak reference on entry and unregisters
it before exit. done_socket() breaks any weak references to the
specified socket. read_from_socket() then checks whether the weak
reference was broken, and doesn't access the socket any more if so.
Replace almost all uses of enum connection_state with struct
connection_status. This removes the assumption that errno values used
by the system are between 0 and 100000. The GNU Hurd uses values like
ENOENT = 0x40000002 and EMIG_SERVER_DIED = -308.
This commit is derived from my attachments 450 and 467 to bug 1013.
It seems GnuTLS is not as good at negotiating a supported protocol as
OpenSSL is. ELinks tries to work around that by retrying with a
different protocol if the SSL library reports an error. However,
ELinks must not automatically retry POST requests where some data may
have already reached the server; POST is not a safe method in HTTP.
So instead, collect the name of the TLS-incapable server in a blacklist
when ELinks e.g. loads an HTML form from it; the actual POST can then
immediately use the protocol that worked.
It's a bit ugly that src/network/socket.c now uses
protocol/http/blacklist.h. It might be better to move the blacklist
files out of the http directory, and perhaps merge them with the
BitTorrent blacklisting code.
It is unlikely because the standard members of struct sockaddr_in
(sin_family, sin_port, sin_addr) already require at least 8 bytes
and I don't know of any system that has size_t larger than that.
Besides, at least glibc pads the structure to 16 bytes.
When get_pasv6_socket was merged into get_pasv_socket on 2005-04-15,
the AF_INET6 of get_pasv6_socket was lost and the merged function
always returned AF_INET sockets. This then made getsockname fill
only part of the struct sockaddr_in6, and ELinks sent to the server
an EPRT command that had half the bits missing from the IPv6 address.
At least ftp.funet.fi then rejected the command, helpfully saying
what the address should have been.
This commit fixes active FTP over IPv6. Passive FTP was already fixed
in 0.11.3.GIT (887d650efe), on 2007-05-01.
Revert commit 2d6840b9bd9d3a7a45a5ad92b4e98ff7224d6d97. It is causing
passive FTP via IPv6 to fail on ftp.funet.fi. ELinks sends PASV and
the server says "425 You cannot use PASV on IPv6 connections. Use EPSV
instead."
- Include arpa/inet.h to get hton* ntoh* functions.
- Use socklen_t instead of int.
- Try to define PF_INET to AF_INET if it doesn't exist.
Reported-by: Andy Tanenbaum <ast@cs.vu.nl>
