mirror of
https://github.com/v2fly/v2ray-core.git
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473 lines
16 KiB
Go
473 lines
16 KiB
Go
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// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package tls
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import (
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"crypto"
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"crypto/aes"
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"crypto/cipher"
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"crypto/des"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/rc4"
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"crypto/sha1"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/x509"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
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"hash"
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)
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// a keyAgreement implements the client and server side of a TLS key agreement
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// protocol by generating and processing key exchange messages.
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type keyAgreement interface {
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// On the server side, the first two methods are called in order.
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// In the case that the key agreement protocol doesn't use a
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// ServerKeyExchange message, generateServerKeyExchange can return nil,
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// nil.
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generateServerKeyExchange(*Config, *Certificate, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error)
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processClientKeyExchange(*Config, *Certificate, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, uint16) ([]byte, error)
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// On the client side, the next two methods are called in order.
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// This method may not be called if the server doesn't send a
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// ServerKeyExchange message.
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processServerKeyExchange(*Config, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate, *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error
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generateClientKeyExchange(*Config, *clientHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error)
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}
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const (
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// suiteECDH indicates that the cipher suite involves elliptic curve
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// Diffie-Hellman. This means that it should only be selected when the
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// client indicates that it supports ECC with a curve and point format
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// that we're happy with.
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suiteECDHE = 1 << iota
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// suiteECDSA indicates that the cipher suite involves an ECDSA
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// signature and therefore may only be selected when the server's
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// certificate is ECDSA. If this is not set then the cipher suite is
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// RSA based.
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suiteECDSA
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// suiteTLS12 indicates that the cipher suite should only be advertised
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// and accepted when using TLS 1.2.
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suiteTLS12
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// suiteSHA384 indicates that the cipher suite uses SHA384 as the
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// handshake hash.
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suiteSHA384
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// suiteDefaultOff indicates that this cipher suite is not included by
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// default.
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suiteDefaultOff
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)
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// A cipherSuite is a specific combination of key agreement, cipher and MAC function.
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type cipherSuite struct {
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id uint16
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// the lengths, in bytes, of the key material needed for each component.
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keyLen int
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macLen int
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ivLen int
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ka func(version uint16) keyAgreement
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// flags is a bitmask of the suite* values, above.
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flags int
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cipher func(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{}
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mac func(version uint16, macKey []byte) macFunction
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aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
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}
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var cipherSuites = []*cipherSuite{
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// Ciphersuite order is chosen so that ECDHE comes before plain RSA and
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// AEADs are the top preference.
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12 | suiteDefaultOff, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA | suiteTLS12 | suiteDefaultOff, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteDefaultOff, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, rsaKA, 0, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
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// RC4-based cipher suites are disabled by default.
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, rsaKA, suiteDefaultOff, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteDefaultOff, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA | suiteDefaultOff, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
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}
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// A cipherSuiteTLS13 defines only the pair of the AEAD algorithm and hash
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// algorithm to be used with HKDF. See RFC 8446, Appendix B.4.
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type cipherSuiteTLS13 struct {
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id uint16
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keyLen int
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aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
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hash crypto.Hash
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}
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var cipherSuitesTLS13 = []*cipherSuiteTLS13{
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{TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA256},
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{TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, 32, aeadChaCha20Poly1305, crypto.SHA256},
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{TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA384},
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}
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func cipherRC4(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} {
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cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(key)
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return cipher
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}
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func cipher3DES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} {
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block, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key)
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if isRead {
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return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
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}
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return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
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}
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func cipherAES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} {
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block, _ := aes.NewCipher(key)
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if isRead {
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return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
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}
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return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
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}
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// macSHA1 returns a macFunction for the given protocol version.
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func macSHA1(version uint16, key []byte) macFunction {
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if version == VersionSSL30 {
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mac := ssl30MAC{
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h: sha1.New(),
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key: make([]byte, len(key)),
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}
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copy(mac.key, key)
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return mac
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}
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return tls10MAC{h: hmac.New(newConstantTimeHash(sha1.New), key)}
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}
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// macSHA256 returns a SHA-256 based MAC. These are only supported in TLS 1.2
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// so the given version is ignored.
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func macSHA256(version uint16, key []byte) macFunction {
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return tls10MAC{h: hmac.New(sha256.New, key)}
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}
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type macFunction interface {
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// Size returns the length of the MAC.
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Size() int
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// MAC appends the MAC of (seq, header, data) to out. The extra data is fed
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// into the MAC after obtaining the result to normalize timing. The result
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// is only valid until the next invocation of MAC as the buffer is reused.
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MAC(seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte
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}
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type aead interface {
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cipher.AEAD
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// explicitNonceLen returns the number of bytes of explicit nonce
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// included in each record. This is eight for older AEADs and
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// zero for modern ones.
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explicitNonceLen() int
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}
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const (
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aeadNonceLength = 12
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noncePrefixLength = 4
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)
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// prefixNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD and prefixes a fixed portion of the nonce to
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// each call.
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type prefixNonceAEAD struct {
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// nonce contains the fixed part of the nonce in the first four bytes.
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nonce [aeadNonceLength]byte
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aead cipher.AEAD
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}
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func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return aeadNonceLength - noncePrefixLength }
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func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() }
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func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return f.NonceSize() }
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func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
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copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce)
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return f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonce[:], plaintext, additionalData)
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}
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func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce)
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return f.aead.Open(out, f.nonce[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
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}
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// xoredNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD by XORing in a fixed pattern to the nonce
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// before each call.
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type xorNonceAEAD struct {
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nonceMask [aeadNonceLength]byte
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aead cipher.AEAD
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}
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func (f *xorNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return 8 } // 64-bit sequence number
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func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() }
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func (f *xorNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return 0 }
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func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
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for i, b := range nonce {
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f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
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}
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result := f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonceMask[:], plaintext, additionalData)
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for i, b := range nonce {
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f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
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}
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return result
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}
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func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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for i, b := range nonce {
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f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
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}
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result, err := f.aead.Open(out, f.nonceMask[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
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for i, b := range nonce {
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f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
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}
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return result, err
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}
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func aeadAESGCM(key, noncePrefix []byte) aead {
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if len(noncePrefix) != noncePrefixLength {
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panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
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}
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aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
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if err != nil {
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panic(err)
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}
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aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
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if err != nil {
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panic(err)
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}
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ret := &prefixNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
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copy(ret.nonce[:], noncePrefix)
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return ret
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}
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func aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
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if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength {
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panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
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}
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aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
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if err != nil {
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panic(err)
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}
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aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
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if err != nil {
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panic(err)
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}
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ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
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copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask)
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return ret
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}
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func aeadChaCha20Poly1305(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
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if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength {
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panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
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}
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aead, err := chacha20poly1305.New(key)
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if err != nil {
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panic(err)
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}
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ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
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copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask)
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return ret
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}
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// ssl30MAC implements the SSLv3 MAC function, as defined in
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// www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/draft302.txt section 5.2.3.1
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type ssl30MAC struct {
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h hash.Hash
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key []byte
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buf []byte
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}
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func (s ssl30MAC) Size() int {
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return s.h.Size()
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}
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var ssl30Pad1 = [48]byte{0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36}
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var ssl30Pad2 = [48]byte{0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c}
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// MAC does not offer constant timing guarantees for SSL v3.0, since it's deemed
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// useless considering the similar, protocol-level POODLE vulnerability.
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func (s ssl30MAC) MAC(seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte {
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padLength := 48
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if s.h.Size() == 20 {
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padLength = 40
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}
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s.h.Reset()
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s.h.Write(s.key)
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s.h.Write(ssl30Pad1[:padLength])
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s.h.Write(seq)
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s.h.Write(header[:1])
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s.h.Write(header[3:5])
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s.h.Write(data)
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s.buf = s.h.Sum(s.buf[:0])
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s.h.Reset()
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s.h.Write(s.key)
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s.h.Write(ssl30Pad2[:padLength])
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s.h.Write(s.buf)
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return s.h.Sum(s.buf[:0])
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}
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type constantTimeHash interface {
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hash.Hash
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ConstantTimeSum(b []byte) []byte
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}
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// cthWrapper wraps any hash.Hash that implements ConstantTimeSum, and replaces
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// with that all calls to Sum. It's used to obtain a ConstantTimeSum-based HMAC.
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type cthWrapper struct {
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h constantTimeHash
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}
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func (c *cthWrapper) Size() int { return c.h.Size() }
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func (c *cthWrapper) BlockSize() int { return c.h.BlockSize() }
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func (c *cthWrapper) Reset() { c.h.Reset() }
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func (c *cthWrapper) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return c.h.Write(p) }
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func (c *cthWrapper) Sum(b []byte) []byte { return c.h.ConstantTimeSum(b) }
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func newConstantTimeHash(h func() hash.Hash) func() hash.Hash {
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return func() hash.Hash {
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return &cthWrapper{h().(constantTimeHash)}
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}
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}
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|
||
|
// tls10MAC implements the TLS 1.0 MAC function. RFC 2246, Section 6.2.3.
|
||
|
type tls10MAC struct {
|
||
|
h hash.Hash
|
||
|
buf []byte
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (s tls10MAC) Size() int {
|
||
|
return s.h.Size()
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// MAC is guaranteed to take constant time, as long as
|
||
|
// len(seq)+len(header)+len(data)+len(extra) is constant. extra is not fed into
|
||
|
// the MAC, but is only provided to make the timing profile constant.
|
||
|
func (s tls10MAC) MAC(seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte {
|
||
|
s.h.Reset()
|
||
|
s.h.Write(seq)
|
||
|
s.h.Write(header)
|
||
|
s.h.Write(data)
|
||
|
res := s.h.Sum(s.buf[:0])
|
||
|
if extra != nil {
|
||
|
s.h.Write(extra)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return res
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func rsaKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
|
||
|
return rsaKeyAgreement{}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func ecdheECDSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
|
||
|
return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
|
||
|
isRSA: false,
|
||
|
version: version,
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func ecdheRSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
|
||
|
return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
|
||
|
isRSA: true,
|
||
|
version: version,
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// mutualCipherSuite returns a cipherSuite given a list of supported
|
||
|
// ciphersuites and the id requested by the peer.
|
||
|
func mutualCipherSuite(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuite {
|
||
|
for _, id := range have {
|
||
|
if id == want {
|
||
|
return cipherSuiteByID(id)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func cipherSuiteByID(id uint16) *cipherSuite {
|
||
|
for _, cipherSuite := range utlsSupportedCipherSuites {
|
||
|
if cipherSuite.id == id {
|
||
|
return cipherSuite
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
|
||
|
for _, id := range have {
|
||
|
if id == want {
|
||
|
return cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
|
||
|
for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 {
|
||
|
if cipherSuite.id == id {
|
||
|
return cipherSuite
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// A list of cipher suite IDs that are, or have been, implemented by this
|
||
|
// package.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// Taken from https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml
|
||
|
const (
|
||
|
// TLS 1.0 - 1.2 cipher suites.
|
||
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x0005
|
||
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000a
|
||
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x002f
|
||
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0035
|
||
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003c
|
||
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x009c
|
||
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x009d
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc007
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc009
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc00a
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc011
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc012
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc013
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc014
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc023
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc027
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02f
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02b
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc030
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc02c
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 uint16 = 0xcca8
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 uint16 = 0xcca9
|
||
|
|
||
|
// TLS 1.3 cipher suites.
|
||
|
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1301
|
||
|
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x1302
|
||
|
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1303
|
||
|
|
||
|
// TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV isn't a standard cipher suite but an indicator
|
||
|
// that the client is doing version fallback. See RFC 7507.
|
||
|
TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV uint16 = 0x5600
|
||
|
)
|