daemon: Address shortcoming in previous security fix for CVE-2024-27297.
This is a followup to8f4ffb3fae
. Commit8f4ffb3fae
fell short in two ways: (1) it didn’t have any effet for fixed-output derivations performed in a chroot, which is the case for all of them except those using “builtin:download” and “builtin:git-download”, and (2) it did not preserve ownership when copying, leading to “suspicious ownership or permission […] rejecting this build output” errors. * nix/libstore/build.cc (DerivationGoal::buildDone): Account for ‘chrootRootDir’ when copying ‘drv.outputs’. * nix/libutil/util.cc (copyFileRecursively): Add ‘fchown’ and ‘fchownat’ calls to preserve file ownership; this is necessary for chrooted fixed-output derivation builds. * nix/libutil/util.hh: Update comment. Change-Id: Ib59f040e98fed59d1af81d724b874b592cbef156
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@ -1387,13 +1387,14 @@ void DerivationGoal::buildDone()
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make sure that there's no stale file descriptor pointing to it
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(CVE-2024-27297). */
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foreach (DerivationOutputs::iterator, i, drv.outputs) {
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if (pathExists(i->second.path)) {
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Path pivot = i->second.path + ".tmp";
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copyFileRecursively(i->second.path, pivot, true);
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int err = rename(pivot.c_str(), i->second.path.c_str());
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Path output = chrootRootDir + i->second.path;
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if (pathExists(output)) {
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Path pivot = output + ".tmp";
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copyFileRecursively(output, pivot, true);
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int err = rename(pivot.c_str(), output.c_str());
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if (err != 0)
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throw SysError(format("renaming `%1%' to `%2%'")
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% pivot % i->second.path);
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% pivot % output);
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}
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}
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}
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@ -422,6 +422,7 @@ static void copyFileRecursively(int sourceroot, const Path &source,
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if (destinationFd == -1) throw SysError(format("opening `%1%'") % source);
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copyFile(sourceFd, destinationFd);
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fchown(destinationFd, st.st_uid, st.st_gid);
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} else if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
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char target[st.st_size + 1];
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ssize_t result = readlinkat(sourceroot, source.c_str(), target, st.st_size);
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@ -430,6 +431,8 @@ static void copyFileRecursively(int sourceroot, const Path &source,
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int err = symlinkat(target, destinationroot, destination.c_str());
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if (err != 0)
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throw SysError(format("creating symlink `%1%'") % destination);
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fchownat(destinationroot, destination.c_str(),
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st.st_uid, st.st_gid, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
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} else if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
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int err = mkdirat(destinationroot, destination.c_str(), 0755);
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if (err != 0)
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@ -455,6 +458,7 @@ static void copyFileRecursively(int sourceroot, const Path &source,
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for (auto & i : readDirectory(sourceFd))
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copyFileRecursively((int)sourceFd, i.name, (int)destinationFd, i.name,
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deleteSource);
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fchown(destinationFd, st.st_uid, st.st_gid);
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} else throw Error(format("refusing to copy irregular file `%1%'") % source);
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if (deleteSource)
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@ -102,9 +102,10 @@ void deletePath(const Path & path);
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void deletePath(const Path & path, unsigned long long & bytesFreed,
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size_t linkThreshold = 1);
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/* Copy SOURCE to DESTINATION, recursively. Throw if SOURCE contains a file
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that is not a regular file, symlink, or directory. When DELETESOURCE is
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true, delete source files once they have been copied. */
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/* Copy SOURCE to DESTINATION, recursively, preserving ownership. Throw if
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SOURCE contains a file that is not a regular file, symlink, or directory.
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When DELETESOURCE is true, delete source files once they have been
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copied. */
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void copyFileRecursively(const Path &source, const Path &destination,
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bool deleteSource = false);
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