gnu: wpa-supplicant: Add fixes for CVE-2015-{5310,5314,5315,5316}.
* gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch: New files. * gnu-system.am (dist_patch_DATA): Add them. * gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-minimal)[source]: Add patches.
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Mark H Weaver
parent
875b2f3d5e
commit
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@ -692,6 +692,10 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
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gnu/packages/patches/wicd-template-instantiation.patch \
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gnu/packages/patches/wicd-urwid-1.3.patch \
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gnu/packages/patches/wmctrl-64-fix.patch \
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gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch \
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gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch \
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gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch \
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gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch \
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gnu/packages/patches/xf86-video-ark-remove-mibstore.patch \
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gnu/packages/patches/xf86-video-ast-remove-mibstore.patch \
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gnu/packages/patches/xf86-video-geode-glibc-2.20.patch \
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@ -716,7 +716,12 @@ commands and their arguments.")
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".tar.gz"))
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(sha256
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(base32
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"05mkp5bx1c3z7h5biddsv0p49gkrq9ksany3anp4wdiv92p5prfc"))))
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"05mkp5bx1c3z7h5biddsv0p49gkrq9ksany3anp4wdiv92p5prfc"))
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(patches
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(map search-patch '("wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch"
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"wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch"
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"wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch"
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"wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch")))))
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(build-system gnu-build-system)
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(arguments
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'(#:phases (alist-replace
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32
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch
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32
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
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From 6b12d93d2c7428a34bfd4b3813ba339ed57b698a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 15:45:50 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no
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PMF in use
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WNM Sleep Mode Response frame is used to update GTK/IGTK only if PMF is
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enabled. Verify that PMF is in use before using this field on station
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side to avoid accepting unauthenticated key updates. (CVE-2015-5310)
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 6 ++++++
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1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
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index 954de67..7d79499 100644
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--- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
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+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
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@@ -187,6 +187,12 @@ static void wnm_sleep_mode_exit_success(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
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end = ptr + key_len_total;
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Key Data", ptr, key_len_total);
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+ if (key_len_total && !wpa_sm_pmf_enabled(wpa_s->wpa)) {
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+ wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO,
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+ "WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM-Sleep Mode Response - PMF not enabled");
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+ return;
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+ }
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+
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while (ptr + 1 < end) {
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if (ptr + 2 + ptr[1] > end) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Invalid Key Data element "
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51
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch
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51
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
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From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation
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All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
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room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
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fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
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The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
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buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
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termination. (CVE-2015-5314)
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++---
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
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index cb83ff7..9f787ab 100644
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--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
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+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
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@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
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/*
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* the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set
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*/
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- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
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if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow "
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"attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)",
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@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
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}
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wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
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data->in_frag_pos += len;
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+ }
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment",
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(int) len);
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return;
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@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
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* buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last)
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*/
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if (data->in_frag_pos) {
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- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
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- data->in_frag_pos += len;
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pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
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len = data->in_frag_pos;
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
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--
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1.9.1
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54
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch
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54
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
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From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation
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All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
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room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
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fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
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The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
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buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
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termination. (CVE-2015-5315)
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++----
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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index 1f78544..75ceef1 100644
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--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
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/*
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* buffer and ACK the fragment
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*/
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- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
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data->in_frag_pos += len;
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if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack "
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@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
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return NULL;
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}
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wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
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-
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+ }
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
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resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD,
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EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE,
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EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData));
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@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
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* we're buffering and this is the last fragment
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*/
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if (data->in_frag_pos) {
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- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
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(int) len);
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- data->in_frag_pos += len;
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pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
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len = data->in_frag_pos;
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}
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--
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1.9.1
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34
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch
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34
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
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From 95577884ca4fa76be91344ff7a8d5d1e6dc3da61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 19:35:44 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message
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If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity
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exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and
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data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange()
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did not take this corner case into account and could end up
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dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid
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message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316)
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 3 ++-
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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index 75ceef1..892b590 100644
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--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
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wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
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fin:
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- bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
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+ if (data->grp)
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+ bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
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BN_clear_free(x);
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BN_clear_free(y);
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if (data->outbuf == NULL) {
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--
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1.9.1
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