openbsd-ports/archivers/unzip/patches/patch-unix_unix_c
brad a937c7a5d3 Improvement on the existing directory traversal patch, fixes the case
where the path component includes a quoted slash.
2003-08-17 23:48:40 +00:00

111 lines
4.2 KiB
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$OpenBSD: patch-unix_unix_c,v 1.2 2003/08/17 23:48:40 brad Exp $
--- unix/unix.c.orig 2002-01-21 17:54:42.000000000 -0500
+++ unix/unix.c 2003-08-17 19:25:19.000000000 -0400
@@ -421,7 +421,8 @@ int mapname(__G__ renamed)
*/
{
char pathcomp[FILNAMSIZ]; /* path-component buffer */
- char *pp, *cp=(char *)NULL; /* character pointers */
+ char *pp, *cp=(char *)NULL, /* character pointers */
+ *dp=(char *)NULL;
char *lastsemi=(char *)NULL; /* pointer to last semi-colon in pathcomp */
#ifdef ACORN_FTYPE_NFS
char *lastcomma=(char *)NULL; /* pointer to last comma in pathcomp */
@@ -429,6 +430,8 @@ int mapname(__G__ renamed)
#endif
int quote = FALSE; /* flags */
int killed_ddot = FALSE; /* is set when skipping "../" pathcomp */
+ int killed_qslash = FALSE; /* is set when skipping "^V/" pathcomp */
+ int snarf_ddot = FALSE; /* Is set while scanning for "../" */
int error = MPN_OK;
register unsigned workch; /* hold the character being tested */
@@ -467,6 +470,18 @@ int mapname(__G__ renamed)
while ((workch = (uch)*cp++) != 0) {
if (quote) { /* if character quoted, */
+ if (pp == pathcomp) {
+ quote = FALSE;
+ if (workch == '.')
+ /* Oh no you don't... */
+ goto ddot_hack;
+ if (workch == '/') {
+ /* We *never* allow quote-slash at the beginning */
+ killed_qslash = TRUE;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
*pp++ = (char)workch; /* include it literally */
quote = FALSE;
} else
@@ -481,15 +496,45 @@ int mapname(__G__ renamed)
break;
case '.':
- if (pp == pathcomp) { /* nothing appended yet... */
+ if (pp == pathcomp) {
+ddot_hack:
+ /* nothing appended yet... */
if (*cp == '/') { /* don't bother appending "./" to */
++cp; /* the path: skip behind the '/' */
break;
- } else if (!uO.ddotflag && *cp == '.' && cp[1] == '/') {
- /* "../" dir traversal detected */
- cp += 2; /* skip over behind the '/' */
- killed_ddot = TRUE; /* set "show message" flag */
- break;
+ } else if (!uO.ddotflag) {
+
+ /*
+ * SECURITY: Skip past control characters if the user
+ * didn't OK use of absolute pathnames. lhh - this is
+ * a very quick, ugly, inefficient fix; it traverses
+ * the WHOLE path, eating up these as it comes to it.
+ */
+ dp = cp;
+ do {
+ workch = (uch)(*dp);
+ if (workch == '/' && snarf_ddot) {
+ /* "../" dir traversal detected */
+ cp = dp + 1; /* skip past the '/' */
+ killed_ddot = TRUE; /* set "show msg" flag */
+ break;
+ } else if (workch == '.' && !snarf_ddot) {
+ snarf_ddot = TRUE;
+ } else if (isprint(workch) ||
+ ((workch > 127) && (workch <= 254))) {
+ /*
+ * Since we found a printable, non-ctrl char,
+ * we can stop looking for '../', the amount
+ * in ../!
+ */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ dp++;
+ } while (*dp != 0);
+
+ if (killed_ddot)
+ break;
}
}
*pp++ = '.';
@@ -534,6 +579,16 @@ int mapname(__G__ renamed)
error = (error & MPN_MASK) | PK_WARN;
}
+ /* Show warning when stripping insecure quoted-slash at beginning of
+ path components */
+ if (killed_qslash && QCOND2) {
+ Info(slide, 0, ((char *)slide,
+ "warning: skipped root directory component(s) in %s\n",
+ FnFilter1(G.filename)));
+ if (!(error & ~MPN_MASK))
+ error = (error & MPN_MASK) | PK_WARN;
+ }
+
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report if directory was created (and no file to create: filename ended
in '/'), check name to be sure it exists, and combine path and name be-