Tor 0.2.3.25, the first stable release in the 0.2.3 branch, features
significantly reduced directory overhead (via microdescriptors),
enormous crypto performance improvements for fast relays on new
enough hardware, a new v3 TLS handshake protocol that can better
resist fingerprinting, support for protocol obfuscation plugins (aka
pluggable transports), better scalability for hidden services, IPv6
support for bridges, performance improvements like allowing clients
to skip the first round-trip on the circuit ("optimistic data") and
refilling token buckets more often, a new "stream isolation" design
to isolate different applications on different circuits, and many
stability, security, and privacy fixes.
Also kill unneeded pthread patch.
Tested by dhill & dcoppa@.
ok dcoppa@
Changes in version 0.2.2.39 - 2012-09-11
Tor 0.2.2.39 fixes two more opportunities for remotely triggerable
assertions.
o Security fixes:
- Fix an assertion failure in tor_timegm() that could be triggered
by a badly formatted directory object. Bug found by fuzzing with
Radamsa. Fixes bug 6811; bugfix on 0.2.0.20-rc.
- Do not crash when comparing an address with port value 0 to an
address policy. This bug could have been used to cause a remote
assertion failure by or against directory authorities, or to
allow some applications to crash clients. Fixes bug 6690; bugfix
on 0.2.1.10-alpha.
No CVEs for these vulnerabilities yet.
Changes in version 0.2.2.38 - 2012-08-12
Tor 0.2.2.38 fixes a rare race condition that can crash exit relays;
fixes a remotely triggerable crash bug; and fixes a timing attack that
could in theory leak path information.
- Never use a bridge or a controller-supplied node as an exit, even
if its exit policy allows it.
- Only build circuits if we have a sufficient threshold of the total
descriptors that are marked in the consensus with the "Exit"
flag.
- Provide controllers with a safer way to implement the cookie
authentication mechanism. With the old method, if another locally
running program could convince a controller that it was the Tor
process, then that program could trick the contoller into telling
it the contents of an arbitrary 32-byte file. The new "SAFECOOKIE"
authentication method uses a challenge-response approach to prevent
this attack.
We are not affected by the openssl vulnerability.
Full release notes:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/release-0.2.2:/ReleaseNotes
ok sthen@ jasper@
- fixes several bugs, and includes a slight tweak to Tor's TLS handshake that
makes relays and bridges that run this new version reachable from Iran again.
* amongst other things, add a tweak to Tor's TLS handshake that makes
relays and bridges that run this new version reachable from Iran.
Add an rc script.
from Pascal Stumpf.
MAINTAINER timeout.
- addresses two potential anonymity issues.
- starts to fix a bug where in rare cases traffic from one Tor stream gets mixed into another stream.
- fixes a variety of smaller issues.
ok fgsch@
