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Security fixes for:

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CVE-2018-1000035 (heap overflow in processing password-protected archives)
CVE-2019-13232 (mishandles the overlapping of files inside a ZIP container)
From Moritz Buhl
This commit is contained in:
naddy 2020-03-11 21:57:31 +00:00
parent 920b2c4ccb
commit caf1a0257d
8 changed files with 423 additions and 28 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

4
archivers/unzip/Makefile
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.64 2019/07/12 20:43:30 sthen Exp $
# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.65 2020/03/11 21:57:31 naddy Exp $
PORTROACH = skipv:551,552
@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ COMMENT = extract, list & test files in a ZIP archive
VERSION = 6.0
DISTNAME = unzip${VERSION:S/.//}
PKGNAME = unzip-${VERSION}
REVISION = 12
REVISION = 13
CATEGORIES = archivers
MASTER_SITES = ${MASTER_SITE_SOURCEFORGE:=infozip/} \
ftp://ftp.info-zip.org/pub/infozip/src/

256
archivers/unzip/patches/patch-extract_c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
$OpenBSD: patch-extract_c,v 1.2 2017/03/23 17:26:17 bluhm Exp $
$OpenBSD: patch-extract_c,v 1.3 2020/03/11 21:57:32 naddy Exp $
Fix CVE-2015-7696: prevent unsigned overflow on invalid input
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=1075942
@ -12,9 +12,12 @@ Fix CVE-2015-7697: infinite loop when extracting empty bzip2 data
https://bugs.debian.org/802160
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1260944
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=1073339
Fix CVE-2019-13232: a zip bomb using overlapped entries
https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/47b3ceae397d21bf822bc2ac73052a4b1daf8e1c
--- extract.c.orig Sat Mar 14 02:32:52 2009
+++ extract.c Tue Mar 21 16:10:27 2017
Index: extract.c
--- extract.c.orig
+++ extract.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved.
@ -31,7 +34,190 @@ Fix CVE-2015-7697: infinite loop when extracting empty bzip2 data
static ZCONST char Far InvalidComprDataEAs[] =
" invalid compressed data for EAs\n";
# if (defined(WIN32) && defined(NTSD_EAS))
@@ -1255,8 +1257,17 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk,
@@ -319,11 +321,130 @@ static ZCONST char Far UnsupportedExtraField[] =
"\nerror: unsupported extra-field compression type (%u)--skipping\n";
static ZCONST char Far BadExtraFieldCRC[] =
"error [%s]: bad extra-field CRC %08lx (should be %08lx)\n";
+static ZCONST char Far NotEnoughMemCover[] =
+ "error: not enough memory for bomb detection\n";
+static ZCONST char Far OverlappedComponents[] =
+ "error: invalid zip file with overlapped components (possible zip bomb)\n";
+/* A growable list of spans. */
+typedef zoff_t bound_t;
+typedef struct {
+ bound_t beg; /* start of the span */
+ bound_t end; /* one past the end of the span */
+} span_t;
+typedef struct {
+ span_t *span; /* allocated, distinct, and sorted list of spans */
+ size_t num; /* number of spans in the list */
+ size_t max; /* allocated number of spans (num <= max) */
+} cover_t;
+
+/*
+ * Return the index of the first span in cover whose beg is greater than val.
+ * If there is no such span, then cover->num is returned.
+ */
+static size_t cover_find(cover, val)
+ cover_t *cover;
+ bound_t val;
+{
+ size_t lo = 0, hi = cover->num;
+ while (lo < hi) {
+ size_t mid = (lo + hi) >> 1;
+ if (val < cover->span[mid].beg)
+ hi = mid;
+ else
+ lo = mid + 1;
+ }
+ return hi;
+}
+
+/* Return true if val lies within any one of the spans in cover. */
+static int cover_within(cover, val)
+ cover_t *cover;
+ bound_t val;
+{
+ size_t pos = cover_find(cover, val);
+ return pos > 0 && val < cover->span[pos - 1].end;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a new span to the list, but only if the new span does not overlap any
+ * spans already in the list. The new span covers the values beg..end-1. beg
+ * must be less than end.
+ *
+ * Keep the list sorted and merge adjacent spans. Grow the allocated space for
+ * the list as needed. On success, 0 is returned. If the new span overlaps any
+ * existing spans, then 1 is returned and the new span is not added to the
+ * list. If the new span is invalid because beg is greater than or equal to
+ * end, then -1 is returned. If the list needs to be grown but the memory
+ * allocation fails, then -2 is returned.
+ */
+static int cover_add(cover, beg, end)
+ cover_t *cover;
+ bound_t beg;
+ bound_t end;
+{
+ size_t pos;
+ int prec, foll;
+
+ if (beg >= end)
+ /* The new span is invalid. */
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Find where the new span should go, and make sure that it does not
+ overlap with any existing spans. */
+ pos = cover_find(cover, beg);
+ if ((pos > 0 && beg < cover->span[pos - 1].end) ||
+ (pos < cover->num && end > cover->span[pos].beg))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Check for adjacencies. */
+ prec = pos > 0 && beg == cover->span[pos - 1].end;
+ foll = pos < cover->num && end == cover->span[pos].beg;
+ if (prec && foll) {
+ /* The new span connects the preceding and following spans. Merge the
+ following span into the preceding span, and delete the following
+ span. */
+ cover->span[pos - 1].end = cover->span[pos].end;
+ cover->num--;
+ memmove(cover->span + pos, cover->span + pos + 1,
+ (cover->num - pos) * sizeof(span_t));
+ }
+ else if (prec)
+ /* The new span is adjacent only to the preceding span. Extend the end
+ of the preceding span. */
+ cover->span[pos - 1].end = end;
+ else if (foll)
+ /* The new span is adjacent only to the following span. Extend the
+ beginning of the following span. */
+ cover->span[pos].beg = beg;
+ else {
+ /* The new span has gaps between both the preceding and the following
+ spans. Assure that there is room and insert the span. */
+ if (cover->num == cover->max) {
+ size_t max = cover->max == 0 ? 16 : cover->max << 1;
+ span_t *span = realloc(cover->span, max * sizeof(span_t));
+ if (span == NULL)
+ return -2;
+ cover->span = span;
+ cover->max = max;
+ }
+ memmove(cover->span + pos + 1, cover->span + pos,
+ (cover->num - pos) * sizeof(span_t));
+ cover->num++;
+ cover->span[pos].beg = beg;
+ cover->span[pos].end = end;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+
+
/**************************************/
/* Function extract_or_test_files() */
/**************************************/
@@ -374,6 +495,29 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type er
}
#endif /* !SFX || SFX_EXDIR */
+ /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with a
+ span that covers the central directory though the end of the file. */
+ if (G.cover == NULL) {
+ G.cover = malloc(sizeof(cover_t));
+ if (G.cover == NULL) {
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
+ return PK_MEM;
+ }
+ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->span = NULL;
+ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->max = 0;
+ }
+ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0;
+ if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&
+ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) ||
+ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
+ G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory,
+ G.ziplen) != 0) {
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
+ return PK_MEM;
+ }
+
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The basic idea of this function is as follows. Since the central di-
rectory lies at the end of the zipfile and the member files lie at the
@@ -591,7 +735,8 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type er
if (error > error_in_archive)
error_in_archive = error;
/* ...and keep going (unless disk full or user break) */
- if (G.disk_full > 1 || error_in_archive == IZ_CTRLC) {
+ if (G.disk_full > 1 || error_in_archive == IZ_CTRLC ||
+ error == PK_BOMB) {
/* clear reached_end to signal premature stop ... */
reached_end = FALSE;
/* ... and cancel scanning the central directory */
@@ -1060,6 +1205,11 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk,
/* seek_zipf(__G__ pInfo->offset); */
request = G.pInfo->offset + G.extra_bytes;
+ if (cover_within((cover_t *)G.cover, request)) {
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
+ return PK_BOMB;
+ }
inbuf_offset = request % INBUFSIZ;
bufstart = request - inbuf_offset;
@@ -1255,8 +1405,17 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk,
if (G.lrec.compression_method == STORED) {
zusz_t csiz_decrypted = G.lrec.csize;
@ -50,7 +236,61 @@ Fix CVE-2015-7697: infinite loop when extracting empty bzip2 data
if (G.lrec.ucsize != csiz_decrypted) {
Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
LoadFarStringSmall2(WrnStorUCSizCSizDiff),
@@ -2023,7 +2034,8 @@ static int TestExtraField(__G__ ef, ef_len)
@@ -1591,6 +1750,18 @@ reprompt:
return IZ_CTRLC; /* cancel operation by user request */
}
#endif
+ error = cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, request,
+ G.cur_zipfile_bufstart + (G.inptr - G.inbuf));
+ if (error < 0) {
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
+ return PK_MEM;
+ }
+ if (error != 0) {
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
+ return PK_BOMB;
+ }
#ifdef MACOS /* MacOS is no preemptive OS, thus call event-handling by hand */
UserStop();
#endif
@@ -1992,6 +2163,34 @@ static int extract_or_test_member(__G) /* return PK
}
undefer_input(__G);
+
+ if ((G.lrec.general_purpose_bit_flag & 8) != 0) {
+ /* skip over data descriptor (harder than it sounds, due to signature
+ * ambiguity)
+ */
+# define SIG 0x08074b50
+# define LOW 0xffffffff
+ uch buf[12];
+ unsigned shy = 12 - readbuf((char *)buf, 12);
+ ulg crc = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf);
+ ulg clen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 4);
+ ulg ulen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 8); /* or high clen if ZIP64 */
+ if (crc == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */
+ (G.lrec.crc32 != SIG || /* if not SIG, have signature */
+ (clen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */
+ ((G.lrec.csize & LOW) != SIG || /* if not SIG, have signature */
+ (ulen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */
+ (G.zip64 ? G.lrec.csize >> 32 : G.lrec.ucsize) != SIG
+ /* if not SIG, have signature */
+ )))))
+ /* skip four more bytes to account for signature */
+ shy += 4 - readbuf((char *)buf, 4);
+ if (G.zip64)
+ shy += 8 - readbuf((char *)buf, 8); /* skip eight more for ZIP64 */
+ if (shy)
+ error = PK_ERR;
+ }
+
return error;
} /* end function extract_or_test_member() */
@@ -2023,7 +2222,8 @@ static int TestExtraField(__G__ ef, ef_len)
ebID = makeword(ef);
ebLen = (unsigned)makeword(ef+EB_LEN);
@ -60,7 +300,7 @@ Fix CVE-2015-7697: infinite loop when extracting empty bzip2 data
/* Discovered some extra field inconsistency! */
if (uO.qflag)
Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, "%-22s ",
@@ -2158,11 +2170,19 @@ static int TestExtraField(__G__ ef, ef_len)
@@ -2158,11 +2358,19 @@ static int TestExtraField(__G__ ef, ef_len)
}
break;
case EF_PKVMS:
@ -81,7 +321,7 @@ Fix CVE-2015-7697: infinite loop when extracting empty bzip2 data
break;
case EF_PKW32:
case EF_PKUNIX:
@@ -2217,15 +2237,32 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offs
@@ -2217,15 +2425,32 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offs
ulg eb_ucsize;
uch *eb_ucptr;
int r;
@ -117,7 +357,7 @@ Fix CVE-2015-7697: infinite loop when extracting empty bzip2 data
if (
#ifdef INT_16BIT
(((ulg)(extent)eb_ucsize) != eb_ucsize) ||
@@ -2700,6 +2737,12 @@ __GDEF
@@ -2700,6 +2925,12 @@ __GDEF
int err=BZ_OK;
int repeated_buf_err;
bz_stream bstrm;

55
archivers/unzip/patches/patch-fileio_c
View File

@ -1,9 +1,14 @@
$OpenBSD: patch-fileio_c,v 1.1 2015/02/06 21:37:04 naddy Exp $
$OpenBSD: patch-fileio_c,v 1.2 2020/03/11 21:57:32 naddy Exp $
Fix CVE-2014-8141: out-of-bounds read issues in getZip64Data()
Fix CVE-2018-1000035: buffer overflow for password-protected archives
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-1000035
Fix CVE-2019-13232: a zip bomb using overlapped entries
https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/47b3ceae397d21bf822bc2ac73052a4b1daf8e1c
--- fileio.c.orig Mon Apr 20 02:03:44 2009
+++ fileio.c Thu Feb 5 18:57:59 2015
Index: fileio.c
--- fileio.c.orig
+++ fileio.c
@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ static ZCONST char Far FilenameTooLongTrunc[] =
#endif
static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldTooLong[] =
@ -13,7 +18,49 @@ Fix CVE-2014-8141: out-of-bounds read issues in getZip64Data()
#ifdef WINDLL
static ZCONST char Far DiskFullQuery[] =
@@ -2295,7 +2297,12 @@ int do_string(__G__ length, option) /* return PK-typ
@@ -530,8 +532,10 @@ void undefer_input(__G)
* This condition was checked when G.incnt_leftover was set > 0 in
* defer_leftover_input(), and it is NOT allowed to touch G.csize
* before calling undefer_input() when (G.incnt_leftover > 0)
- * (single exception: see read_byte()'s "G.csize <= 0" handling) !!
+ * (single exception: see readbyte()'s "G.csize <= 0" handling) !!
*/
+ if (G.csize < 0L)
+ G.csize = 0L;
G.incnt = G.incnt_leftover + (int)G.csize;
G.inptr = G.inptr_leftover - (int)G.csize;
G.incnt_leftover = 0;
@@ -1580,7 +1584,11 @@ int UZ_EXP UzpPassword (pG, rcnt, pwbuf, size, zfn, ef
int r = IZ_PW_ENTERED;
char *m;
char *prompt;
-
+ char *zfnf;
+ char *efnf;
+ size_t zfnfl;
+ int isOverflow;
+
#ifndef REENTRANT
/* tell picky compilers to shut up about "unused variable" warnings */
pG = pG;
@@ -1588,7 +1596,15 @@ int UZ_EXP UzpPassword (pG, rcnt, pwbuf, size, zfn, ef
if (*rcnt == 0) { /* First call for current entry */
*rcnt = 2;
- if ((prompt = (char *)malloc(2*FILNAMSIZ + 15)) != (char *)NULL) {
+ zfnf = FnFilter1(zfn);
+ efnf = FnFilter2(efn);
+ zfnfl = strlen(zfnf);
+ isOverflow = TRUE;
+ if (2*FILNAMSIZ >= zfnfl && (2*FILNAMSIZ - zfnfl) >= strlen(efnf))
+ {
+ isOverflow = FALSE;
+ }
+ if ((isOverflow == FALSE) && ((prompt = (char *)malloc(2*FILNAMSIZ + 15)) != (char *)NULL)) {
sprintf(prompt, LoadFarString(PasswPrompt),
FnFilter1(zfn), FnFilter2(efn));
m = prompt;
@@ -2295,7 +2311,12 @@ int do_string(__G__ length, option) /* return PK-typ
if (readbuf(__G__ (char *)G.extra_field, length) == 0)
return PK_EOF;
/* Looks like here is where extra fields are read */

15
archivers/unzip/patches/patch-globals_c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
$OpenBSD: patch-globals_c,v 1.1 2020/03/11 21:57:32 naddy Exp $
Fix CVE-2019-13232: a zip bomb using overlapped entries
https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/47b3ceae397d21bf822bc2ac73052a4b1daf8e1c
--- globals.c.orig
+++ globals.c
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ Uz_Globs *globalsCtor()
# if (!defined(NO_TIMESTAMPS))
uO.D_flag=1; /* default to '-D', no restoration of dir timestamps */
# endif
+ G.cover = NULL; /* not allocated yet */
#endif
uO.lflag=(-1);

23
archivers/unzip/patches/patch-globals_h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
$OpenBSD: patch-globals_h,v 1.1 2020/03/11 21:57:32 naddy Exp $
Fix CVE-2019-13232: a zip bomb using overlapped entries
https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/47b3ceae397d21bf822bc2ac73052a4b1daf8e1c
--- globals.h.orig
+++ globals.h
@@ -260,12 +260,15 @@ typedef struct Globals {
ecdir_rec ecrec; /* used in unzip.c, extract.c */
z_stat statbuf; /* used by main, mapname, check_for_newer */
+ int zip64; /* true if Zip64 info in extra field */
+
int mem_mode;
uch *outbufptr; /* extract.c static */
ulg outsize; /* extract.c static */
int reported_backslash; /* extract.c static */
int disk_full;
int newfile;
+ void **cover; /* used in extract.c for bomb detection */
int didCRlast; /* fileio static */
ulg numlines; /* fileio static: number of lines printed */

34
archivers/unzip/patches/patch-list_c
View File

@ -1,14 +1,16 @@
$OpenBSD: patch-list_c,v 1.1 2017/03/23 17:26:17 bluhm Exp $
$OpenBSD: patch-list_c,v 1.2 2020/03/11 21:57:32 naddy Exp $
Fix: increase size of cfactorstr array to avoid buffer overflow
Fix CVE-2018-18384: increase size of cfactorstr array to avoid buffer overflow
https://bugs.debian.org/741384
https://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/bugs/53/
Fix CVE-2014-9913: buffer overflow in unzip
https://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/bugs/27/
https://bugs.debian.org/847485
https://launchpad.net/bugs/387350
--- list.c.orig Sun Feb 8 18:11:34 2009
+++ list.c Tue Mar 21 16:10:27 2017
Index: list.c
--- list.c.orig
+++ list.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
{
int do_this_file=FALSE, cfactor, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL;
@ -38,3 +40,27 @@ Fix CVE-2014-9913: buffer overflow in unzip
}
#if 0 /* GRR/Euro: add this? */
@@ -378,9 +389,9 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
}
#else /* !WINDLL */
if (cfactor == 100)
- sprintf(cfactorstr, LoadFarString(CompFactor100));
+ snprintf(cfactorstr, sizeof(cfactorstr), LoadFarString(CompFactor100));
else
- sprintf(cfactorstr, LoadFarString(CompFactorStr), sgn, cfactor);
+ snprintf(cfactorstr, sizeof(cfactorstr), LoadFarString(CompFactorStr), sgn, cfactor);
if (longhdr)
Info(slide, 0, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(LongHdrStats),
FmZofft(G.crec.ucsize, "8", "u"), methbuf,
@@ -460,9 +471,9 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
#else /* !WINDLL */
if (cfactor == 100)
- sprintf(cfactorstr, LoadFarString(CompFactor100));
+ snprintf(cfactorstr, sizeof(cfactorstr), LoadFarString(CompFactor100));
else
- sprintf(cfactorstr, LoadFarString(CompFactorStr), sgn, cfactor);
+ snprintf(cfactorstr, sizeof(cfactorstr), LoadFarString(CompFactorStr), sgn, cfactor);
if (longhdr) {
Info(slide, 0, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(LongFileTrailer),
FmZofft(tot_ucsize, "8", "u"), FmZofft(tot_csize, "8", "u"),

48
archivers/unzip/patches/patch-process_c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
$OpenBSD: patch-process_c,v 1.3 2017/03/23 17:26:17 bluhm Exp $
$OpenBSD: patch-process_c,v 1.4 2020/03/11 21:57:32 naddy Exp $
Fix: handle the PKWare verification bit of internal attributes
https://bugs.debian.org/630078
@ -8,9 +8,12 @@ Fix: do not ignore extra fields containing Unix Timestamps
https://bugs.debian.org/842993
Fix: restore uid and gid information when requested
https://bugs.debian.org/689212
Fix CVE-2019-13232: a zip bomb using overlapped entries
https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/47b3ceae397d21bf822bc2ac73052a4b1daf8e1c
--- process.c.orig Fri Mar 6 02:25:10 2009
+++ process.c Tue Mar 21 16:10:27 2017
Index: process.c
--- process.c.orig
+++ process.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved.
@ -18,7 +21,21 @@ Fix: restore uid and gid information when requested
See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later
(the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use.
@@ -1729,6 +1729,13 @@ int process_cdir_file_hdr(__G) /* return PK-type er
@@ -637,6 +637,13 @@ void free_G_buffers(__G) /* releases all memory al
}
#endif
+ /* Free the cover span list and the cover structure. */
+ if (G.cover != NULL) {
+ free(*(G.cover));
+ free(G.cover);
+ G.cover = NULL;
+ }
+
} /* end function free_G_buffers() */
@@ -1729,6 +1736,13 @@ int process_cdir_file_hdr(__G) /* return PK-type er
else if (uO.L_flag > 1) /* let -LL force lower case for all names */
G.pInfo->lcflag = 1;
@ -32,7 +49,7 @@ Fix: restore uid and gid information when requested
/* do Amigas (AMIGA_) also have volume labels? */
if (IS_VOLID(G.crec.external_file_attributes) &&
(G.pInfo->hostnum == FS_FAT_ || G.pInfo->hostnum == FS_HPFS_ ||
@@ -1751,6 +1758,12 @@ int process_cdir_file_hdr(__G) /* return PK-type er
@@ -1751,6 +1765,12 @@ int process_cdir_file_hdr(__G) /* return PK-type er
= (G.crec.general_purpose_bit_flag & (1 << 11)) == (1 << 11);
#endif
@ -45,7 +62,7 @@ Fix: restore uid and gid information when requested
return PK_COOL;
} /* end function process_cdir_file_hdr() */
@@ -1888,48 +1901,82 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len)
@@ -1888,48 +1908,84 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len)
and a 4-byte version of disk start number.
Sets both local header and central header fields. Not terribly clever,
but it means that this procedure is only called in one place.
@ -60,6 +77,8 @@ Fix: restore uid and gid information when requested
+#define Z64FLGS 0xffff
+#define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff
+
+ G.zip64 = FALSE;
+
if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL)
return PK_COOL;
@ -144,7 +163,16 @@ Fix: restore uid and gid information when requested
ef_buf += (eb_len + EB_HEADSIZE);
ef_len -= (eb_len + EB_HEADSIZE);
}
@@ -2867,10 +2914,13 @@ unsigned ef_scan_for_izux(ef_buf, ef_len, ef_is_c, dos
@@ -2037,6 +2093,8 @@ int getUnicodeData(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len)
(ZCONST char *)(offset + ef_buf), ULen);
G.unipath_filename[ULen] = '\0';
}
+
+ G.zip64 = TRUE;
}
/* Skip this extra field block */
@@ -2867,10 +2925,13 @@ unsigned ef_scan_for_izux(ef_buf, ef_len, ef_is_c, dos
break;
case EF_IZUNIX2:
@ -160,7 +188,7 @@ Fix: restore uid and gid information when requested
#ifdef IZ_HAVE_UXUIDGID
if (have_new_type_eb > 1)
break; /* IZUNIX3 overrides IZUNIX2 e.f. block ! */
@@ -2886,6 +2936,8 @@ unsigned ef_scan_for_izux(ef_buf, ef_len, ef_is_c, dos
@@ -2886,6 +2947,8 @@ unsigned ef_scan_for_izux(ef_buf, ef_len, ef_is_c, dos
/* new 3rd generation Unix ef */
have_new_type_eb = 2;
@ -169,7 +197,7 @@ Fix: restore uid and gid information when requested
/*
Version 1 byte version of this extra field, currently 1
UIDSize 1 byte Size of UID field
@@ -2897,7 +2949,7 @@ unsigned ef_scan_for_izux(ef_buf, ef_len, ef_is_c, dos
@@ -2897,7 +2960,7 @@ unsigned ef_scan_for_izux(ef_buf, ef_len, ef_is_c, dos
#ifdef IZ_HAVE_UXUIDGID
if (eb_len >= EB_UX3_MINLEN
&& z_uidgid != NULL
@ -178,7 +206,7 @@ Fix: restore uid and gid information when requested
/* only know about version 1 */
{
uch uid_size;
@@ -2906,13 +2958,11 @@ unsigned ef_scan_for_izux(ef_buf, ef_len, ef_is_c, dos
@@ -2906,13 +2969,11 @@ unsigned ef_scan_for_izux(ef_buf, ef_len, ef_is_c, dos
uid_size = *((EB_HEADSIZE + 1) + ef_buf);
gid_size = *((EB_HEADSIZE + uid_size + 2) + ef_buf);

16
archivers/unzip/patches/patch-unzip_h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
$OpenBSD: patch-unzip_h,v 1.1 2020/03/11 21:57:32 naddy Exp $
Fix CVE-2019-13232: a zip bomb using overlapped entries
https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/47b3ceae397d21bf822bc2ac73052a4b1daf8e1c
Index: unzip.h
--- unzip.h.orig
+++ unzip.h
@@ -645,6 +645,7 @@ typedef struct _Uzp_cdir_Rec {
#define PK_NOZIP 9 /* zipfile not found */
#define PK_PARAM 10 /* bad or illegal parameters specified */
#define PK_FIND 11 /* no files found */
+#define PK_BOMB 12 /* likely zip bomb */
#define PK_DISK 50 /* disk full */
#define PK_EOF 51 /* unexpected EOF */