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r10 vanished.

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r11 includes most patches.

+ gcc -shared to build object module.
This commit is contained in:
espie 2000-11-02 17:39:46 +00:00
parent 1c6e8adce2
commit 82f34a7ab5
11 changed files with 31 additions and 186 deletions
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6
security/socks5/files/md5
View File

@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
MD5 (socks5-v1.0r10.tar.gz) = 99d99a1723f793d7cb8e8043e72da9b1
RMD160 (socks5-v1.0r10.tar.gz) = 472a777b829a79f8259b13d1ba8a438aafaf1ef0
SHA1 (socks5-v1.0r10.tar.gz) = a1b733e4591b0925c22f3b2e6e345aaa4a631675
MD5 (socks5-v1.0r11.tar.gz) = 4f4f3932bbb9a8d47a63502a6820c948
RMD160 (socks5-v1.0r11.tar.gz) = 48e59778adeed1936243e737aae31c60e544564c
SHA1 (socks5-v1.0r11.tar.gz) = b5b03ea4df26dc53b6d3126c0b0aed45c5291eaf

18
security/socks5/patches/patch-clients_ftp_cmds.c
View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
$OpenBSD: patch-clients_ftp_cmds.c,v 1.1 2000/08/03 00:02:34 brad Exp $
This fixes a date related roll-over problem.
--- clients/ftp/cmds.c.orig Wed Aug 2 19:03:51 2000
+++ clients/ftp/cmds.c Wed Aug 2 19:05:11 2000
@@ -726,9 +726,9 @@
&yy, &mo, &day, &hour, &min, &sec);
tm = gmtime(&stbuf.st_mtime);
tm->tm_mon++;
- if (tm->tm_year > yy%100)
+ if ((tm->tm_year + 1900) > yy)
return (1);
- else if (tm->tm_year == yy%100) {
+ else if ((tm->tm_year + 1900) == yy) {
if (tm->tm_mon > mo)
return (1);
} else if (tm->tm_mon == mo) {

28
security/socks5/patches/patch-clients_ftp_ftp.c
View File

@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
$OpenBSD: patch-clients_ftp_ftp.c,v 1.1 2000/08/03 00:04:47 brad Exp $
This patch prevents some file handles from accidentally being closed.
--- clients/ftp/ftp.c.orig Wed Aug 2 19:11:35 2000
+++ clients/ftp/ftp.c Wed Aug 2 19:14:29 2000
@@ -913,6 +913,10 @@
if (closefunc != NULL)
(*closefunc)(fin);
fclose(dout);
+ if(data >= 0) {
+ close(data);
+ data = -1;
+ }
getreply(0);
Signal(SIGINT, oldintr);
if (oldintp)
@@ -1252,6 +1256,10 @@
gettimeofday(&stop, (struct timezone *)0);
fclose(din);
+ if(data >= 0) {
+ close(data);
+ data = -1;
+ }
getreply(0);
if (bytes > 0 && is_retr) {

24
security/socks5/patches/patch-configure
View File

@ -1,15 +1,19 @@
--- configure.orig Mon Aug 2 11:01:03 1999
+++ configure Wed Aug 2 19:22:08 2000
@@ -4711,7 +4711,7 @@
UNIX_SV*|UNIX_System_V*)
SHLIB_LFLAGS="-G"
;;
- FreeBSD*|NetBSD*)
+ FreeBSD*|NetBSD*|OpenBSD*)
SHLIB_LFLAGS="-Bshareable"
--- configure.orig Mon Aug 2 17:01:03 1999
+++ configure Thu Nov 2 16:45:14 2000
@@ -4716,6 +4716,12 @@ if test "$ac_cv_func_dlopen" = "yes" -o
SHLIB_CFLAGS="-fpic"
PRELOADS="LD_PRELOAD"
@@ -4763,7 +4763,7 @@
;;
+ OpenBSD*)
+ SHLIB_LD=gcc
+ SHLIB_LFLAGS="-shared -fpic"
+ SHLIB_CFLAGS="-fpic"
+ PRELOADS="LD_PRELOAD"
+ ;;
SunOS*4.*)
SHLIB_CFLAGS="-P"
SHLIB_LFLAGS="-dp -assert pure-text -assert nodefinitions"
@@ -4763,7 +4769,7 @@ if test "$ac_cv_func_dlopen" = "yes" -o
UNIX_SV*|UNIX_System_V*)
SHLIB_CFLAGS=
;;

17
security/socks5/patches/patch-lib_cache.c
View File

@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
$OpenBSD: patch-lib_cache.c,v 1.1 2000/08/03 00:03:21 brad Exp $
This patch fixes a problem with the SOCKS client library for dup().
The ftp client uses dup().
--- lib/cache.c.orig Wed Aug 2 19:06:02 2000
+++ lib/cache.c Wed Aug 2 19:06:34 2000
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@
lsProxyInfo *n, *p = *pp;
for (n = p?p->next:NULL; p ; p = n, n = n?n->next:NULL) {
- if (--(p->refcount) > 0) continue;
if (p->cinfo.fd == rfd) p->cinfo.fd = S5InvalidIOHandle;
+ if (--(p->refcount) > 0) continue;
S5BufCleanContext(&p->cinfo);
free(p);
}

32
security/socks5/patches/patch-lib_hostname.c
View File

@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
$OpenBSD: patch-lib_hostname.c,v 1.1 2000/08/03 00:01:52 brad Exp $
The patch is for clients that do not have DNS resolution. Sites that do not
use the remote name resolution do not have to apply this patch.
The fakehost files (/tmp/.s5fakehost-<uid>) created with releases prior to
release 10 are not compatible.
If the fakehost file has size 65284 bytes, it is the old version. Delete the
file, apply the following patch, and rebuild the clients. The new fakehost
file has size 32644 bytes.
--- lib/hostname.c.orig Wed Aug 2 19:01:40 2000
+++ lib/hostname.c Wed Aug 2 19:02:49 2000
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@
strncpy(hostname, name, MIN(strlen(name), S5_HOSTNAME_SIZE-1));
hostname[MIN(strlen(name), S5_HOSTNAME_SIZE-1)] = '\0';
- lseek(fd, (j-1)*256+sizeof(int), SEEK_SET);
+ lseek(fd, (j-1)*S5_HOSTNAME_SIZE+sizeof(int), SEEK_SET);
if (REAL(write)(fd, hostname, sizeof(hostname)) != sizeof(hostname)) {
S5LogUpdate(S5LogDefaultHandle, S5_LOG_ERROR, 0, "GetHostFromFile: write table failed %m");
SetWriteLock(0);
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@
if (fd > 0) {
SetReadLock(1);
- lseek(fd, (i-1)*256+sizeof(int), SEEK_SET);
+ lseek(fd, (i-1)*S5_HOSTNAME_SIZE+sizeof(int), SEEK_SET);
if (REAL(read)(fd, hostname, len) != len) {
S5LogUpdate(S5LogDefaultHandle, S5_LOG_ERROR, 0, "lsGetCachedHostname: read fake table failed %m");

40
security/socks5/patches/patch-lib_upwd.c
View File

@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
$OpenBSD: patch-lib_upwd.c,v 1.1 2000/08/03 00:04:12 brad Exp $
This patch prevents the client for sending zero length username/passwords
and prevents the server from accepting zero length username/passwords.
Only useful for sites using username/password authentication (rfc1929).
--- lib/upwd.c.orig Wed Aug 2 19:07:13 2000
+++ lib/upwd.c Wed Aug 2 19:10:52 2000
@@ -78,6 +78,16 @@
pwd = getenv("SOCKS5_PASSWD");
MUTEX_UNLOCK(env_mutex);
+ if(!user || strlen(user)==0) {
+ S5LogUpdate(S5LogDefaultHandle, S5_LOG_DEBUG(10), 0, "UPWD: Missing username ");
+ return AUTH_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if(!pwd || strlen(pwd)==0) {
+ S5LogUpdate(S5LogDefaultHandle, S5_LOG_DEBUG(10), 0, "UPWD: Missing password ");
+ return AUTH_FAIL;
+ }
+
SETVERS(buf, 1);
SETULEN(buf, user);
SETUSER(buf, user);
@@ -107,12 +117,12 @@
goto done;
}
- if (GetString(sd, name, &timerm) < 0) {
+ if (GetString(sd, name, &timerm) <= 0) {
S5LogUpdate(S5LogDefaultHandle, S5_LOG_DEBUG(10), 0, "UPWD: Failed to get valid username");
goto done;
}
- if (GetString(sd, passwd, &timerm) < 0) {
+ if (GetString(sd, passwd, &timerm) <= 0) {
S5LogUpdate(S5LogDefaultHandle, S5_LOG_DEBUG(10), 0, "UPWD: Failed to get valid password");
goto done;
}

24
security/socks5/patches/patch-rld-c
View File

@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
# $OpenBSD: patch-rld-c,v 1.1 2000/03/27 23:02:47 form Exp $
--- lib/rld.c.orig Tue Mar 28 04:56:16 2000
+++ lib/rld.c Tue Mar 28 04:56:49 2000
@@ -118,8 +118,10 @@
/* Synchronize access to func and lib opening functions if we can... */
#if __FreeBSD__ != 2
+#ifndef __OpenBSD__
name++;
#endif
+#endif
if (*fptr) return;
@@ -143,7 +145,7 @@
static void DGetOriginalFunc(void **fptr, char *name, int libmask) {
/* Synchronize access to func and lib opening functions if we can... */
-#ifndef __FreeBSD__
+#if !defined(__FreeBSD__) && !defined(__OpenBSD__)
name++;
#endif

12
security/socks5/patches/patch-socks5-conf-5
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
# $OpenBSD: patch-socks5-conf-5,v 1.1 2000/03/27 23:02:48 form Exp $
# $OpenBSD: patch-socks5-conf-5,v 1.2 2000/11/02 17:39:47 espie Exp $
--- man/man5/socks5.conf.5.orig Tue Mar 28 06:20:55 2000
+++ man/man5/socks5.conf.5 Tue Mar 28 06:21:14 2000
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
--- man/man5/socks5.conf.5.orig Tue Dec 1 17:55:52 1998
+++ man/man5/socks5.conf.5 Thu Nov 2 16:29:44 2000
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ The socks5 daemon authenicates clients t
.PP
When the configuration file does not contain \fB auth\fP lines, any authentication works. Omitting auth lines is the same as specifying an \fIauthpattern\fP containing -, any authentication. If \fBauth\fP lines are used, clients not matching will be refused.
.PP
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
To ensure that the socks5 daemon receives usernames from the client, and to allow socks4 clients to use the server, set the \fIauthpattern\fP order to n,u. With socks5 clients, the socks daemon chooses Username/Password authentication before no authentication.
.PP
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ set \fIvariable\fP \fIvalue\fP
set
Identifies entries that initialize environment variables for internal use.
.P
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
.PP
.SH PROXY ENTRIES
Proxy entries describe the addresses clients can only reach through other SOCKS servers and identify how the daemon contacts the host. The daemon contacts the host directly when the configuration file does not contain an entry for that host.
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ server to hide their attack of other sys
or destination host.
.PP
.SH SEE ALSO

8
security/socks5/patches/patch-socks5-passwd-5
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
# $OpenBSD: patch-socks5-passwd-5,v 1.1 2000/03/27 23:02:48 form Exp $
# $OpenBSD: patch-socks5-passwd-5,v 1.2 2000/11/02 17:39:47 espie Exp $
--- man/man5/socks5.passwd.5.orig Tue Mar 28 06:22:38 2000
+++ man/man5/socks5.passwd.5 Tue Mar 28 06:22:42 2000
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
--- man/man5/socks5.passwd.5.orig Tue Jun 3 23:42:19 1997
+++ man/man5/socks5.passwd.5 Thu Nov 2 16:29:44 2000
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ permit u - - - - - joe
.SH SOCKS5 Clients
The socks5 client library uses the SOCKS5_USER and SOCKS5_PASSWD environment variables for a user's username and password. Set the username on the client with the SOCKS5_USER environment variable. Set the password on the client with the SOCKS5_PASSWD variable.
.SH SEE ALSO

8
security/socks5/patches/patch-stopsocks-1
View File

@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
# $OpenBSD: patch-stopsocks-1,v 1.1 2000/03/27 23:02:48 form Exp $
# $OpenBSD: patch-stopsocks-1,v 1.2 2000/11/02 17:39:47 espie Exp $
--- man/man1/stopsocks.1.orig Tue Mar 28 06:19:44 2000
+++ man/man1/stopsocks.1 Tue Mar 28 06:20:06 2000
--- man/man1/stopsocks.1.orig Thu Oct 1 17:32:03 1998
+++ man/man1/stopsocks.1 Thu Nov 2 16:29:45 2000
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.TH stopsocks 1 "1 Oct 1998"
+.TH stopsocks 8 "1 Oct 1998"
.SH NAME
stopsocks \- A script to manage standalone socks5 daemons
.SH SYNOPSIS
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ You may optionally include PID with the
Specifies the process that receives \fIsignal\fP
.PP
.SH SEE ALSO