Fix for CVE-2016-2538.
from Brad (maintainer)
This commit is contained in:
ajacoutot
parent
9a8a0869a4
commit
562c51d947
@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
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# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.143 2016/02/20 22:46:46 ajacoutot Exp $
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# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.144 2016/03/01 10:18:25 ajacoutot Exp $
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ONLY_FOR_ARCHS= amd64 i386 powerpc sparc64
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COMMENT= multi system emulator
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DISTNAME= qemu-2.2.1
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REVISION= 19
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REVISION= 20
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CATEGORIES= emulators
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MASTER_SITES= http://wiki.qemu.org/download/
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EXTRACT_SUFX= .tar.bz2
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44
emulators/qemu/patches/patch-hw_usb_core_c
Normal file
44
emulators/qemu/patches/patch-hw_usb_core_c
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
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$OpenBSD: patch-hw_usb_core_c,v 1.1 2016/03/01 10:18:25 ajacoutot Exp $
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usb: check RNDIS message length
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When processing remote NDIS control message packets, the USB Net
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device emulator uses a fixed length(4096) data buffer. The incoming
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packet length could exceed this limit. Add a check to avoid it.
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CVE-2016-2538
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--- hw/usb/core.c.orig Mon Feb 29 18:44:35 2016
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+++ hw/usb/core.c Mon Feb 29 18:47:09 2016
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@@ -128,9 +128,16 @@ static void do_token_setup(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p)
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}
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usb_packet_copy(p, s->setup_buf, p->iov.size);
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+ s->setup_index = 0;
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p->actual_length = 0;
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s->setup_len = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6];
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- s->setup_index = 0;
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+ if (s->setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) {
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+ fprintf(stderr,
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+ "usb_generic_handle_packet: ctrl buffer too small (%d > %zu)\n",
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+ s->setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf));
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+ p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
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+ return;
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+ }
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request = (s->setup_buf[0] << 8) | s->setup_buf[1];
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value = (s->setup_buf[3] << 8) | s->setup_buf[2];
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@@ -151,13 +158,6 @@ static void do_token_setup(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p)
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}
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s->setup_state = SETUP_STATE_DATA;
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} else {
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- if (s->setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) {
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- fprintf(stderr,
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- "usb_generic_handle_packet: ctrl buffer too small (%d > %zu)\n",
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- s->setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf));
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- p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
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- return;
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- }
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if (s->setup_len == 0)
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s->setup_state = SETUP_STATE_ACK;
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else
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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$OpenBSD: patch-hw_usb_dev-network_c,v 1.1 2016/02/20 22:46:46 ajacoutot Exp $
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$OpenBSD: patch-hw_usb_dev-network_c,v 1.2 2016/03/01 10:18:25 ajacoutot Exp $
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usb: check USB configuration descriptor object
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@ -9,8 +9,18 @@ which leads to a null dereference error. Add check to avoid it.
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CVE-2016-2393
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--- hw/usb/dev-network.c.orig Thu Feb 18 19:21:12 2016
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+++ hw/usb/dev-network.c Thu Feb 18 19:21:37 2016
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usb: check RNDIS buffer offsets & length
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When processing remote NDIS control message packets,
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the USB Net device emulator uses a fixed length(4096) data buffer.
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The incoming informationBufferOffset & Length combination could
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overflow and cross that range. Check control message buffer
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offsets and length to avoid it.
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CVE-2016-2538
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--- hw/usb/dev-network.c.orig Tue Mar 10 13:38:27 2015
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+++ hw/usb/dev-network.c Mon Feb 29 18:49:32 2016
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@@ -650,7 +650,8 @@ typedef struct USBNetState {
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static int is_rndis(USBNetState *s)
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@ -21,3 +31,36 @@ CVE-2016-2393
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}
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static int ndis_query(USBNetState *s, uint32_t oid,
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@@ -911,8 +912,9 @@ static int rndis_query_response(USBNetState *s,
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bufoffs = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferOffset) + 8;
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buflen = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferLength);
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- if (bufoffs + buflen > length)
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+ if (buflen > length || bufoffs >= length || bufoffs + buflen > length) {
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return USB_RET_STALL;
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+ }
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infobuflen = ndis_query(s, le32_to_cpu(buf->OID),
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bufoffs + (uint8_t *) buf, buflen, infobuf,
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@@ -957,8 +959,9 @@ static int rndis_set_response(USBNetState *s,
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bufoffs = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferOffset) + 8;
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buflen = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferLength);
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- if (bufoffs + buflen > length)
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+ if (buflen > length || bufoffs >= length || bufoffs + buflen > length) {
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return USB_RET_STALL;
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+ }
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ret = ndis_set(s, le32_to_cpu(buf->OID),
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bufoffs + (uint8_t *) buf, buflen);
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@@ -1208,8 +1211,9 @@ static void usb_net_handle_dataout(USBNetState *s, USB
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if (le32_to_cpu(msg->MessageType) == RNDIS_PACKET_MSG) {
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uint32_t offs = 8 + le32_to_cpu(msg->DataOffset);
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uint32_t size = le32_to_cpu(msg->DataLength);
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- if (offs + size <= len)
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+ if (offs < len && size < len && offs + size <= len) {
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qemu_send_packet(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), s->out_buf + offs, size);
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+ }
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}
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s->out_ptr -= len;
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memmove(s->out_buf, &s->out_buf[len], s->out_ptr);
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@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
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$OpenBSD: patch-hw_usb_hcd-ohci_c,v 1.1 2016/02/20 22:46:46 ajacoutot Exp $
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$OpenBSD: patch-hw_usb_hcd-ohci_c,v 1.2 2016/03/01 10:18:25 ajacoutot Exp $
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usb: ohci avoid multiple eof timers
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ohci: allocate timer only once.
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When transitioning an OHCI controller to the OHCI_USB_OPERATIONAL
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state, it creates an eof timer object in 'ohci_bus_start'.
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It does not check if one already exists. This results in memory
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leakage and null dereference issue. Add a check to avoid it.
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Allocate timer once, at init time, instead of allocating/freeing
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it all the time when starting/stopping the bus. Simplifies the
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code, also fixes bugs (memory leak) due to missing checks whenever
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the time is already allocated or not.
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CVE-2016-2391
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