Update to haproxy-1.9.10

This commit is contained in:
danj 2019-08-13 00:34:03 +00:00
parent a1b1a660d0
commit 3a4e833600
4 changed files with 14 additions and 14 deletions

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@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.58 2019/07/12 20:48:27 sthen Exp $
# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.59 2019/08/13 00:34:03 danj Exp $
COMMENT = reliable, high performance TCP/HTTP load balancer
DISTNAME = haproxy-1.9.8
DISTNAME = haproxy-1.9.10
CATEGORIES = net www
HOMEPAGE = http://www.haproxy.org/
MAINTAINER = Daniel Jakots <obsd@chown.me>

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@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
SHA256 (haproxy-1.9.8.tar.gz) = LZozANvYcbw1t0OoPKr1D+z78GKQYQIxyi0zT9BMKu4=
SIZE (haproxy-1.9.8.tar.gz) = 2376526
SHA256 (haproxy-1.9.10.tar.gz) = jsLVP+J5Vjo+oI9HLtNJVGjCGmR3QVYBr59oLn+eVjo=
SIZE (haproxy-1.9.10.tar.gz) = 2386066

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@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
$OpenBSD: patch-doc_haproxy_1,v 1.5 2018/12/05 16:32:13 danj Exp $
$OpenBSD: patch-doc_haproxy_1,v 1.6 2019/08/13 00:34:03 danj Exp $
Index: doc/haproxy.1
--- doc/haproxy.1.orig
+++ doc/haproxy.1
@@ -196,8 +196,7 @@ This signal is intercepted and ignored on systems with
@@ -212,8 +212,7 @@ This signal is intercepted and ignored on systems with
.SH SEE ALSO

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
$OpenBSD: patch-src_ssl_sock_c,v 1.11 2019/06/10 23:01:13 danj Exp $
$OpenBSD: patch-src_ssl_sock_c,v 1.12 2019/08/13 00:34:03 danj Exp $
Index: src/ssl_sock.c
--- src/ssl_sock.c.orig
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Index: src/ssl_sock.c
if (bind_conf->ssl_conf.early_data) {
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY);
SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data(ctx, global.tune.bufsize - global.tune.maxrewrite);
@@ -5217,7 +5217,7 @@ int ssl_sock_handshake(struct connection *conn, unsign
@@ -5216,7 +5216,7 @@ int ssl_sock_handshake(struct connection *conn, unsign
if (!conn->xprt_ctx)
goto out_error;
@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Index: src/ssl_sock.c
/*
* Check if we have early data. If we do, we have to read them
* before SSL_do_handshake() is called, And there's no way to
@@ -5285,11 +5285,11 @@ int ssl_sock_handshake(struct connection *conn, unsign
@@ -5284,11 +5284,11 @@ int ssl_sock_handshake(struct connection *conn, unsign
if (!errno && conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN)
conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN;
if (!conn->err_code) {
@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Index: src/ssl_sock.c
OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE state = SSL_get_state((SSL *)conn->xprt_ctx);
empty_handshake = state == TLS_ST_BEFORE;
#else
@@ -5369,11 +5369,11 @@ check_error:
@@ -5368,11 +5368,11 @@ check_error:
if (!errno && conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN)
conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN;
if (!conn->err_code) {
@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ Index: src/ssl_sock.c
OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE state = SSL_get_state((SSL *)conn->xprt_ctx);
empty_handshake = state == TLS_ST_BEFORE;
#else
@@ -5417,7 +5417,7 @@ check_error:
@@ -5416,7 +5416,7 @@ check_error:
goto out_error;
}
}
@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Index: src/ssl_sock.c
else {
/*
* If the server refused the early data, we have to send a
@@ -5532,7 +5532,7 @@ static size_t ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn,
@@ -5527,7 +5527,7 @@ static size_t ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn,
continue;
}
@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ Index: src/ssl_sock.c
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS) {
size_t read_length;
@@ -5672,7 +5672,7 @@ static size_t ssl_sock_from_buf(struct connection *con
@@ -5658,7 +5658,7 @@ static size_t ssl_sock_from_buf(struct connection *con
* in which case we accept to do it once again.
*/
while (count) {
@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Index: src/ssl_sock.c
size_t written_data;
#endif
@@ -5693,7 +5693,7 @@ static size_t ssl_sock_from_buf(struct connection *con
@@ -5679,7 +5679,7 @@ static size_t ssl_sock_from_buf(struct connection *con
conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_SEND_UNLIMITED;
}