openbsd-ports/net/unbound/patches/patch-doc_example_conf_in

$OpenBSD: patch-doc_example_conf_in,v 1.10 2012/08/04 20:43:54 sthen Exp $
--- doc/example.conf.in.orig	Thu Aug  2 08:26:14 2012
+++ doc/example.conf.in	Sat Aug  4 10:19:00 2012
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ server:
 	# chroot: "@UNBOUND_CHROOT_DIR@"
 
 	# if given, user privileges are dropped (after binding port),
-	# and the given username is assumed. Default is user "unbound".
+	# and the given username is assumed. Default is user "@UNBOUND_USERNAME@".
 	# If you give "" no privileges are dropped.
 	# username: "@UNBOUND_USERNAME@"
 
@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ python:
 remote-control:
 	# Enable remote control with unbound-control(8) here.
 	# set up the keys and certificates with unbound-control-setup.
-	# control-enable: no
+	control-enable: yes
 
 	# what interfaces are listened to for remote control.
 	# give 0.0.0.0 and ::0 to listen to all interfaces.
update to unbound 1.4.18; includes a crash fix (assertion failure). - rc.d script now generates the unbound-control keys if they don't exist and the sample config file is patched to enable this, various rc.d/unbound actions depend on this, pointed out/ok aja@ 2012-08-04 16:43:54 -04:00			$OpenBSD: patch-doc_example_conf_in,v 1.10 2012/08/04 20:43:54 sthen Exp $
			`--- doc/example.conf.in.orig Thu Aug 2 08:26:14 2012`
			`+++ doc/example.conf.in Sat Aug 4 10:19:00 2012`
SECURITY update to Unbound 1.4.14, incorporating various diffs from Brad, jakob@ and myself. See http://www.unbound.net/downloads/CVE-2011-4528.txt for more details, summary from the above is below: -- Unbound crashes when confronted with a non-standard response from a server for a domain. This domain produces duplicate RRs from a certain type and is DNSSEC signed.Unbound also crashes when confronted with a query that eventually, and under specific circumstances, resolves to a domain that misses expected NSEC3 records. These two problems were discovered within 24 hours, hence a combined vulnerability disclosure. By constructing the non standard responses an attacker can use these vulnerabilities for a DOS attack. To our knowledge 'denial of service' is the only type of exploit possible. -- 2011-12-20 05:49:19 -05:00			`@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ server:`
unbound 1.0.1; bugfix release 2008-07-16 16:34:10 -04:00			`# chroot: "@UNBOUND_CHROOT_DIR@"`

			`# if given, user privileges are dropped (after binding port),`
			`- # and the given username is assumed. Default is user "unbound".`
upgrade to unbound 1.0.2 2008-08-20 04:25:41 -04:00			`+ # and the given username is assumed. Default is user "@UNBOUND_USERNAME@".`
unbound 1.0.1; bugfix release 2008-07-16 16:34:10 -04:00			`# If you give "" no privileges are dropped.`
upgrade to unbound 1.0.2 2008-08-20 04:25:41 -04:00			`# username: "@UNBOUND_USERNAME@"`
unbound 1.0.1; bugfix release 2008-07-16 16:34:10 -04:00
update to unbound 1.4.18; includes a crash fix (assertion failure). - rc.d script now generates the unbound-control keys if they don't exist and the sample config file is patched to enable this, various rc.d/unbound actions depend on this, pointed out/ok aja@ 2012-08-04 16:43:54 -04:00			`@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ python:`
			`remote-control:`
			`# Enable remote control with unbound-control(8) here.`
			`# set up the keys and certificates with unbound-control-setup.`
			`- # control-enable: no`
			`+ control-enable: yes`

			`# what interfaces are listened to for remote control.`
			`# give 0.0.0.0 and ::0 to listen to all interfaces.`