Fix build with OpenSSL 1.1.x

This commit is contained in:
Sunpoet Po-Chuan Hsieh 2018-10-14 16:27:54 +00:00
parent 73ecf0cde0
commit 89061dbf6d
Notes: svn2git 2021-03-31 03:12:20 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=482053

View File

@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
--- vfdecrypt.c.orig 2010-03-24 17:52:45 UTC
+++ vfdecrypt.c
@@ -183,7 +183,11 @@ void adjust_v2_header_byteorder(cencrypt
pwhdr->encrypted_keyblob_size = htonl(pwhdr->encrypted_keyblob_size);
}
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+HMAC_CTX *hmacsha1_ctx = NULL;
+#else
HMAC_CTX hmacsha1_ctx;
+#endif
AES_KEY aes_decrypt_key;
int CHUNK_SIZE=4096; // default
@@ -196,9 +200,15 @@ void compute_iv(uint32_t chunk_no, uint8
unsigned int mdLen;
chunk_no = OSSwapHostToBigInt32(chunk_no);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ HMAC_Init_ex(hmacsha1_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ HMAC_Update(hmacsha1_ctx, (void *) &chunk_no, sizeof(uint32_t));
+ HMAC_Final(hmacsha1_ctx, mdResult, &mdLen);
+#else
HMAC_Init_ex(&hmacsha1_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
HMAC_Update(&hmacsha1_ctx, (void *) &chunk_no, sizeof(uint32_t));
HMAC_Final(&hmacsha1_ctx, mdResult, &mdLen);
+#endif
memcpy(iv, mdResult, CIPHER_BLOCKSIZE);
}
@@ -212,47 +222,84 @@ void decrypt_chunk(uint8_t *ctext, uint8
/* DES3-EDE unwrap operation loosely based on to RFC 2630, section 12.6
* wrapped_key has to be 40 bytes in length. */
int apple_des3_ede_unwrap_key(uint8_t *wrapped_key, int wrapped_key_len, uint8_t *decryptKey, uint8_t *unwrapped_key) {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+#else
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+#endif
uint8_t *TEMP1, *TEMP2, *CEKICV;
uint8_t IV[8] = { 0x4a, 0xdd, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x79, 0xe8, 0x21, 0x05 };
int outlen, tmplen, i;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+#else
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+#endif
/* result of the decryption operation shouldn't be bigger than ciphertext */
TEMP1 = malloc(wrapped_key_len);
TEMP2 = malloc(wrapped_key_len);
CEKICV = malloc(wrapped_key_len);
/* uses PKCS#7 padding for symmetric key operations by default */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, IV);
+ if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, wrapped_key, wrapped_key_len)) {
+#else
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, IV);
-
if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, wrapped_key, wrapped_key_len)) {
+#endif
fprintf(stderr, "internal error (1) during key unwrap operation!\n");
return(-1);
}
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+#else
if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+#endif
fprintf(stderr, "internal error (2) during key unwrap operation!\n");
return(-1);
}
outlen += tmplen;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+#else
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+#endif
/* reverse order of TEMP3 */
for(i = 0; i < outlen; i++) TEMP2[i] = TEMP1[outlen - i - 1];
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+#else
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+#endif
/* uses PKCS#7 padding for symmetric key operations by default */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, TEMP2);
+ if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, CEKICV, &outlen, TEMP2+8, outlen-8)) {
+#else
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, TEMP2);
if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, CEKICV, &outlen, TEMP2+8, outlen-8)) {
+#endif
fprintf(stderr, "internal error (3) during key unwrap operation!\n");
return(-1);
}
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, CEKICV + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+#else
if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, CEKICV + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+#endif
fprintf(stderr, "internal error (4) during key unwrap operation!\n");
return(-1);
}
outlen += tmplen;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+#else
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+#endif
memcpy(unwrapped_key, CEKICV+4, outlen-4);
free(TEMP1);
@@ -279,7 +326,11 @@ int unwrap_v1_header(char *passphrase, c
int unwrap_v2_header(char *passphrase, cencrypted_v2_pwheader *header, uint8_t *aes_key, uint8_t *hmacsha1_key) {
/* derived key is a 3DES-EDE key */
uint8_t derived_key[192/8];
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+#else
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+#endif
uint8_t *TEMP1;
int outlen, tmplen;
@@ -288,22 +339,40 @@ int unwrap_v2_header(char *passphrase, c
print_hex(derived_key, 192/8);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+#else
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+#endif
/* result of the decryption operation shouldn't be bigger than ciphertext */
TEMP1 = malloc(header->encrypted_keyblob_size);
/* uses PKCS#7 padding for symmetric key operations by default */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, derived_key, header->blob_enc_iv);
+
+ if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, header->encrypted_keyblob, header->encrypted_keyblob_size)) {
+#else
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, derived_key, header->blob_enc_iv);
if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, header->encrypted_keyblob, header->encrypted_keyblob_size)) {
+#endif
fprintf(stderr, "internal error (1) during key unwrap operation!\n");
return(-1);
}
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+#else
if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+#endif
fprintf(stderr, "internal error (2) during key unwrap operation!\n");
return(-1);
}
outlen += tmplen;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+#else
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+#endif
memcpy(aes_key, TEMP1, 16);
memcpy(hmacsha1_key, TEMP1, 20);
@@ -446,8 +515,14 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
CHUNK_SIZE = v2header.blocksize;
}
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ hmacsha1_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+ HMAC_CTX_reset(hmacsha1_ctx);
+ HMAC_Init_ex(hmacsha1_ctx, hmacsha1_key, sizeof(hmacsha1_key), EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+#else
HMAC_CTX_init(&hmacsha1_ctx);
HMAC_Init_ex(&hmacsha1_ctx, hmacsha1_key, sizeof(hmacsha1_key), EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+#endif
AES_set_decrypt_key(aes_key, CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH * 8, &aes_decrypt_key);
if (verbose >= 1) {