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xen: apply XSA-{182/183/184}

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Sponsored by:	Citrix Systems R&D
PR:		211482
This commit is contained in:
Roger Pau Monné 2016-08-01 08:35:54 +00:00
parent 8c56705be4
commit 27734a12cb
Notes: svn2git 2021-03-31 03:12:20 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=419430
5 changed files with 225 additions and 3 deletions
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6
emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile
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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
PORTNAME= xen
PKGNAMESUFFIX= -kernel
PORTVERSION= 4.7.0
PORTREVISION= 2
PORTREVISION= 3
CATEGORIES= emulators
MASTER_SITES= http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PORTVERSION}/
@ -39,7 +39,9 @@ PLIST_FILES= /boot/xen \
/boot/xen.4th
EXTRA_PATCHES= ${FILESDIR}/0001-xen-logdirty-prevent-preemption-if-finished.patch:-p1 \
${FILESDIR}/0002-xen-rework-paging_log_dirty_op-to-work-with-hvm-gues.patch:-p1 \
${FILESDIR}/kconf_arch.patch:-p1
${FILESDIR}/kconf_arch.patch:-p1 \
${FILESDIR}/xsa182-unstable.patch:-p1 \
${FILESDIR}/xsa183-unstable.patch:-p1
.include <bsd.port.options.mk>

102
emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa182-unstable.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
From 00593655e231ed5ea20704120037026e33b83fbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2016 14:32:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] x86/pv: Remove unsafe bits from the mod_l?_entry() fastpath
All changes in writeability and cacheability must go through full
re-validation.
Rework the logic as a whitelist, to make it clearer to follow.
This is XSA-182
Reported-by: Jérémie Boutoille <jboutoille@ext.quarkslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
---
xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------
xen/include/asm-x86/page.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
index dbcf6cb..56ca19f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -1852,6 +1852,14 @@ static inline int update_intpte(intpte_t *p,
_t ## e_get_intpte(_o), _t ## e_get_intpte(_n), \
(_m), (_v), (_ad))
+/*
+ * PTE flags that a guest may change without re-validating the PTE.
+ * All other bits affect translation, caching, or Xen's safety.
+ */
+#define FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST \
+ (_PAGE_NX_BIT | _PAGE_AVAIL_HIGH | _PAGE_AVAIL | _PAGE_GLOBAL | \
+ _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_USER)
+
/* Update the L1 entry at pl1e to new value nl1e. */
static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl1e, l1_pgentry_t nl1e,
unsigned long gl1mfn, int preserve_ad,
@@ -1891,9 +1899,8 @@ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl1e, l1_pgentry_t nl1e,
nl1e = l1e_from_pfn(page_to_mfn(page), l1e_get_flags(nl1e));
}
- /* Fast path for identical mapping, r/w, presence, and cachability. */
- if ( !l1e_has_changed(ol1e, nl1e,
- PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PRESENT) )
+ /* Fast path for sufficiently-similar mappings. */
+ if ( !l1e_has_changed(ol1e, nl1e, ~FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST) )
{
adjust_guest_l1e(nl1e, pt_dom);
rc = UPDATE_ENTRY(l1, pl1e, ol1e, nl1e, gl1mfn, pt_vcpu,
@@ -1970,11 +1977,8 @@ static int mod_l2_entry(l2_pgentry_t *pl2e,
return -EINVAL;
}
- /* Fast path for identical mapping and presence. */
- if ( !l2e_has_changed(ol2e, nl2e,
- unlikely(opt_allow_superpage)
- ? _PAGE_PSE | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PRESENT
- : _PAGE_PRESENT) )
+ /* Fast path for sufficiently-similar mappings. */
+ if ( !l2e_has_changed(ol2e, nl2e, ~FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST) )
{
adjust_guest_l2e(nl2e, d);
if ( UPDATE_ENTRY(l2, pl2e, ol2e, nl2e, pfn, vcpu, preserve_ad) )
@@ -2039,8 +2043,8 @@ static int mod_l3_entry(l3_pgentry_t *pl3e,
return -EINVAL;
}
- /* Fast path for identical mapping and presence. */
- if ( !l3e_has_changed(ol3e, nl3e, _PAGE_PRESENT) )
+ /* Fast path for sufficiently-similar mappings. */
+ if ( !l3e_has_changed(ol3e, nl3e, ~FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST) )
{
adjust_guest_l3e(nl3e, d);
rc = UPDATE_ENTRY(l3, pl3e, ol3e, nl3e, pfn, vcpu, preserve_ad);
@@ -2103,8 +2107,8 @@ static int mod_l4_entry(l4_pgentry_t *pl4e,
return -EINVAL;
}
- /* Fast path for identical mapping and presence. */
- if ( !l4e_has_changed(ol4e, nl4e, _PAGE_PRESENT) )
+ /* Fast path for sufficiently-similar mappings. */
+ if ( !l4e_has_changed(ol4e, nl4e, ~FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST) )
{
adjust_guest_l4e(nl4e, d);
rc = UPDATE_ENTRY(l4, pl4e, ol4e, nl4e, pfn, vcpu, preserve_ad);
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h
index 224852a..4ae387f 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h
@@ -313,6 +313,7 @@ void efi_update_l4_pgtable(unsigned int l4idx, l4_pgentry_t);
#define _PAGE_AVAIL2 _AC(0x800,U)
#define _PAGE_AVAIL _AC(0xE00,U)
#define _PAGE_PSE_PAT _AC(0x1000,U)
+#define _PAGE_AVAIL_HIGH (_AC(0x7ff, U) << 12)
#define _PAGE_NX (cpu_has_nx ? _PAGE_NX_BIT : 0)
/* non-architectural flags */
#define _PAGE_PAGED 0x2000U
--
2.1.4

75
emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa183-unstable.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
From 2fd4f34058fb5f87fbd80978dbd2cb458aff565d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2016 18:32:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] x86/entry: Avoid SMAP violation in
compat_create_bounce_frame()
A 32bit guest kernel might be running on user mappings.
compat_create_bounce_frame() must whitelist its guest accesses to avoid
risking a SMAP violation.
For both variants of create_bounce_frame(), re-blacklist user accesses if
execution exits via an exception table redirection.
This is XSA-183 / CVE-2016-6259
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
v2:
* Include CLAC on the exit paths from compat_create_bounce_frame which occur
from faults attempting to load %fs
* Reposition ASM_STAC to avoid breaking the macro-op fusion of test/jz
---
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S | 3 +++
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S | 2 ++
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
index 7f02afd..e80c53c 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ ENTRY(compat_int80_direct_trap)
compat_create_bounce_frame:
ASSERT_INTERRUPTS_ENABLED
mov %fs,%edi
+ ASM_STAC
testb $2,UREGS_cs+8(%rsp)
jz 1f
/* Push new frame at registered guest-OS stack base. */
@@ -364,6 +365,7 @@ compat_create_bounce_frame:
movl TRAPBOUNCE_error_code(%rdx),%eax
.Lft8: movl %eax,%fs:(%rsi) # ERROR CODE
1:
+ ASM_CLAC
/* Rewrite our stack frame and return to guest-OS mode. */
/* IA32 Ref. Vol. 3: TF, VM, RF and NT flags are cleared on trap. */
andl $~(X86_EFLAGS_VM|X86_EFLAGS_RF|\
@@ -403,6 +405,7 @@ compat_crash_page_fault_4:
addl $4,%esi
compat_crash_page_fault:
.Lft14: mov %edi,%fs
+ ASM_CLAC
movl %esi,%edi
call show_page_walk
jmp dom_crash_sync_extable
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
index ad8c64c..f7178cd 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
@@ -420,9 +420,11 @@ domain_crash_page_fault_16:
domain_crash_page_fault_8:
addq $8,%rsi
domain_crash_page_fault:
+ ASM_CLAC
movq %rsi,%rdi
call show_page_walk
ENTRY(dom_crash_sync_extable)
+ ASM_CLAC
# Get out of the guest-save area of the stack.
GET_STACK_END(ax)
leaq STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(guest_cpu_user_regs)(%rax),%rsp
--
2.1.4

2
sysutils/xen-tools/Makefile
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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
PORTNAME= xen
PKGNAMESUFFIX= -tools
PORTVERSION= 4.7.0
PORTREVISION= 3
PORTREVISION= 4
CATEGORIES= sysutils emulators
MASTER_SITES= http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PORTVERSION}/

43
sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa184-qemuu-master.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
From e469db25d6b2e5c71cd15451889226641c53a5cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Jul 2016 17:37:18 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] virtio: error out if guest exceeds virtqueue size
A broken or malicious guest can submit more requests than the virtqueue
size permits.
The guest can submit requests without bothering to wait for completion
and is therefore not bound by virtqueue size. This requires reusing
vring descriptors in more than one request, which is incorrect but
possible. Processing a request allocates a VirtQueueElement and
therefore causes unbounded memory allocation controlled by the guest.
Exit with an error if the guest provides more requests than the
virtqueue size permits. This bounds memory allocation and makes the
buggy guest visible to the user.
Reported-by: Zhenhao Hong <zhenhaohong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
---
hw/virtio/virtio.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio.c b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
index d24f775..f8ac0fb 100644
--- a/hw/virtio/virtio.c
+++ b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
@@ -483,6 +483,11 @@ int virtqueue_pop(VirtQueue *vq, VirtQueueElement *elem)
max = vq->vring.num;
+ if (vq->inuse >= max) {
+ error_report("Virtqueue size exceeded");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
i = head = virtqueue_get_head(vq, vq->last_avail_idx++);
if (virtio_vdev_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_RING_F_EVENT_IDX)) {
vring_set_avail_event(vq, vq->last_avail_idx);
--
2.1.4