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gitea/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go

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// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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// Package poly1305 implements Poly1305 one-time message authentication code as
// specified in https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf.
//
// Poly1305 is a fast, one-time authentication function. It is infeasible for an
// attacker to generate an authenticator for a message without the key. However, a
// key must only be used for a single message. Authenticating two different
// messages with the same key allows an attacker to forge authenticators for other
// messages with the same key.
//
// Poly1305 was originally coupled with AES in order to make Poly1305-AES. AES was
// used with a fixed key in order to generate one-time keys from an nonce.
// However, in this package AES isn't used and the one-time key is specified
// directly.
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package poly1305 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305"
import "crypto/subtle"
// TagSize is the size, in bytes, of a poly1305 authenticator.
const TagSize = 16
// Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
h := New(key)
h.Write(m)
h.Sum(out[:0])
}
// Verify returns true if mac is a valid authenticator for m with the given key.
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func Verify(mac *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) bool {
var tmp [16]byte
Sum(&tmp, m, key)
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(tmp[:], mac[:]) == 1
}
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// New returns a new MAC computing an authentication
// tag of all data written to it with the given key.
// This allows writing the message progressively instead
// of passing it as a single slice. Common users should use
// the Sum function instead.
//
// The key must be unique for each message, as authenticating
// two different messages with the same key allows an attacker
// to forge messages at will.
func New(key *[32]byte) *MAC {
m := &MAC{}
initialize(key, &m.macState)
return m
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}
// MAC is an io.Writer computing an authentication tag
// of the data written to it.
//
// MAC cannot be used like common hash.Hash implementations,
// because using a poly1305 key twice breaks its security.
// Therefore writing data to a running MAC after calling
// Sum or Verify causes it to panic.
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type MAC struct {
mac // platform-dependent implementation
finalized bool
}
// Size returns the number of bytes Sum will return.
func (h *MAC) Size() int { return TagSize }
// Write adds more data to the running message authentication code.
// It never returns an error.
//
// It must not be called after the first call of Sum or Verify.
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func (h *MAC) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
if h.finalized {
panic("poly1305: write to MAC after Sum or Verify")
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}
return h.mac.Write(p)
}
// Sum computes the authenticator of all data written to the
// message authentication code.
func (h *MAC) Sum(b []byte) []byte {
var mac [TagSize]byte
h.mac.Sum(&mac)
h.finalized = true
return append(b, mac[:]...)
}
// Verify returns whether the authenticator of all data written to
// the message authentication code matches the expected value.
func (h *MAC) Verify(expected []byte) bool {
var mac [TagSize]byte
h.mac.Sum(&mac)
h.finalized = true
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expected, mac[:]) == 1
}