read_http_post_inline decodes two hexadecimal digits into one byte at
a time, and it asserts that each hexadecimal digit is valid; however,
both assertions print the first digit when they fail. Fix the assertion
on the second digit to print the second digit.
than 2GiB in the download dialog. Also let regetting big files.
Previously the Content-Length variable in http.c was int, what is
not enough. Now it is long long.
Documentation strings of most options used to contain a "\n" at the
end of each source line. When the option manager displayed these
strings, it treated each "\n" as a hard newline. On 80x24 terminals
however, the option description window has only 60 columes available
for the text (with the default setup.h), and the hard newlines were
further apart, so the option manager wrapped the text a second time,
resulting in rather ugly output where long lones are interleaved with
short ones. This could also cause the text to take up too much
vertical space and not fit in the window.
Replace most of those hard newlines with spaces so that the option
manager (or perhaps BFU) will take care of the wrapping. At the same
time, rewrap the strings in source code so that the source lines are
at most 79 columns wide.
In some options though, there is a list of possible values and their
meanings. In those lists, if the description of one value does not
fit in one line, then continuation lines should be indented. The
option manager and BFU are not currently able to do that. So, keep
the hard newlines in those lists, but rewrap them to 60 columns so
that they are less likely to require further wrapping at runtime.
This makes the option manager display it much better on an 80x24
terminal.
Alternatively, the "\n" newline characters within paragraphs could
have been removed entirely. ELinks would then have line-wrapped the
text to the appropriate width in the info window of the option
manager, but unfortunately not in --config-help.
AFAIK, all bugs in it have been fixed. Some bugs may still be lurking
but they are more likely to get caught if compression is enabled.
I also replaced COMP_NOTE with static text because xgettext does not
support macros in the argument of N_.
(cherry picked from commit 3a9b5d091d)
This simplifies the callers a little and may help implement
simultaneous support for different charsets on different terminals
of the same type (bug 1064).
Except if they have external handlers.
When ELinks receives an event from a terminal, move that terminal to
the beginning of the global "terminals" list, so that the terminals
are always sorted according to the time of the most recent use. Note,
this affects the numbering of bookmark folders in session snapshots.
Add get_default_terminal(), which returns the most recently used
terminal that is still open. Use that in various places that
previously used terminals.prev or terminals.next. Four functions
fetch the size of the terminal for User-Agent headers, and
get_default_terminal() is not really right, but neither was the
original code; add TODO comments in those functions.
When the user chooses "Background and Notify", associate the download
with the terminal where the dialog box is. So any later messages will
then appear in that terminal, if it is still open. However, don't
change the terminal if the download has an external handler.
When a download gets some data, don't immediately check the associated
terminal. Instead, wait for the download to end. Then, if the
terminal of the download has been closed, use get_default_terminal()
instead. If there is no default terminal either, just skip any
message boxes.
Replace almost all uses of enum connection_state with struct
connection_status. This removes the assumption that errno values used
by the system are between 0 and 100000. The GNU Hurd uses values like
ENOENT = 0x40000002 and EMIG_SERVER_DIED = -308.
This commit is derived from my attachments 450 and 467 to bug 1013.
It seems GnuTLS is not as good at negotiating a supported protocol as
OpenSSL is. ELinks tries to work around that by retrying with a
different protocol if the SSL library reports an error. However,
ELinks must not automatically retry POST requests where some data may
have already reached the server; POST is not a safe method in HTTP.
So instead, collect the name of the TLS-incapable server in a blacklist
when ELinks e.g. loads an HTML form from it; the actual POST can then
immediately use the protocol that worked.
It's a bit ugly that src/network/socket.c now uses
protocol/http/blacklist.h. It might be better to move the blacklist
files out of the http directory, and perhaps merge them with the
BitTorrent blacklisting code.
Conflicts:
NEWS
configure.in
The following files also conflicted, but they had not been manually
edited in the elinks-0.12 branch after the previous merge, so I just
kept the 0.13.GIT versions:
doc/man/man1/elinks.1.in
doc/man/man5/elinks.conf.5
doc/man/man5/elinkskeys.5
po/fr.po
po/pl.po
In uri.post, each file name begins and ends with FILE_CHAR.
Previously, file names were not encoded, and names containing
FILE_CHAR could not be used. Because FILE_CHAR is a control
character, the user cannot directly type it in a file input field,
so ELinks asserted that the field did not contain FILE_CHAR.
However, it is possible to get FILE_CHAR in a file input field
with file name completion (ACT_EDIT_AUTO_COMPLETE), causing the
assertion to fail. Now, ELinks encodes FILE_CHAR as "%02", so it
is no longer ambiguous and the assertion is not needed.
gcc-4.3 -O2 was complaining that http_got_header may use uninitialized
version.major and version.minor. That indeed happened with HTTP/0.9
servers, and the PRE_HTTP_1_1(version) check then had an undefined
result, so http->close could remain 0 even though it should have
become 1; fortunately, it was then set to 1 anyway, because there was
no Content-Length header. The undefined version was also saved in
http->recv_version, but it appears nothing ever reads that. So in the
end, the bug did not cause any symptoms at runtime, but the warning
broke the build on gcc-4.3 if ELinks was configured with --enable-debug.
If the user opens the same file again after it is in the cache, then
ELinks does not always open a new connection, so download->conn can be
NULL in init_type_query(), and download->conn->cgi would crash.
Don't read that, then; instead add a new flag cache_entry.cgi, which
http_got_header() sets or clears as soon as possible after the cache
entry has been created.
(cherry picked from commit 81f8ee1fa2)
Posting a 91762123-byte file to test/cgi/big_file.cgi. The CPU
percentages are from "top" set up to update every 10 seconds and
checked near the end of the transfer, so they are less accurate
than the upload rate, which averages over the whole transfer.
buffer=4096: average 1.7 MiB/s, elinks 62% CPU, python 35% CPU.
buffer=8192: average 2.5 MiB/s, elinks 49% CPU, python 42% CPU.
buffer=16384: average 3.1 MiB/s, elinks 40% CPU, python 55% CPU.
buffer=32768: average 3.8 MiB/s, elinks 33% CPU, python 61% CPU.
buffer=65536: average 4.1 MiB/s, elinks 26% CPU, python 70% CPU.
buffer=131072: average 4.2 MiB/s, elinks 28% CPU, python 67% CPU.
buffer=262144: average 4.4 MiB/s, elinks 26% CPU, python 69% CPU.
I'm choosing 32768 as POST_BUFFER_SIZE because the advantages of
larger buffers don't seem very high and keeping this under 65536
may help anyone trying to port ELinks to DOS.
I'm using the same value for HTTP too, just to keep things consistent
until there is a reason to diverge.
Without this patch, ELinks showed garbage at
<http://www.dwheeler.com/oss_fs_why.html> when bzip2 decompression was
enabled. safe_read() in bzip2_read() did not see all of the body
bytes that ELinks had received from the server. After bzip2_read()
received EAGAIN from safe_read() and returned 0, something skipped
1460 bytes.
decompress_data() apparently assumed that read_encoded() returning 0
meant the end of the file, and returned even though len still was
nonzero, i.e. it had not yet written to the pipe all the data that
the caller (read_chunked_http_data() or read_normal_http_data()) had
provided. The caller did not know this, and discarded the data.
(cherry picked from commit 7e5e05ca60)
Without this patch, ELinks showed garbage at
<http://www.dwheeler.com/oss_fs_why.html> when bzip2 decompression was
enabled. safe_read() in bzip2_read() did not see all of the body
bytes that ELinks had received from the server. After bzip2_read()
received EAGAIN from safe_read() and returned 0, something skipped
1460 bytes.
decompress_data() apparently assumed that read_encoded() returning 0
meant the end of the file, and returned even though len still was
nonzero, i.e. it had not yet written to the pipe all the data that
the caller (read_chunked_http_data() or read_normal_http_data()) had
provided. The caller did not know this, and discarded the data.
Move connection.post_fd to http_post.post_fd.
Make connection.done point to the new done_http_connection(),
which calls the new done_http_post(), which closes post_fd.
So done_connection() no longer needs to do that.
Now that done_http_post() exists, a later commit can add dynamically
allocated data in struct http_post and ensure that it will be freed.
As the comment near the end of this function says, conn->info is
already non-NULL if a HTTPS proxy is being used, and the code in fact
correctly frees the previous info. So there is no need to assert its
nonexistence. I added that bug on 2008-05-22, in commit 291a913d1e.
