71 lines
4.9 KiB
Plaintext
71 lines
4.9 KiB
Plaintext
Anthropomorphization
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Semantically, one rich source of jargon constructions is the hackish
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tendency to anthropomorphize hardware and software. English purists and
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academic computer scientists frequently look down on others for
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anthropomorphizing hardware and software, considering this sort of behavior
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to be characteristic of naive misunderstanding. But most hackers
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anthropomorphize freely, frequently describing program behavior in terms of
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wants and desires. Thus it is common to hear hardware or software talked
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about as though it has homunculi talking to each other inside it, with
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intentions and desires. Thus, one hears The protocol handler got confused ,
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or that programs are trying to do things, or one may say of a routine that
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its goal in life is to X . Or: You can't run those two cards on the same
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bus; they fight over interrupt 9. One even hears explanations like ... and
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its poor little brain couldn't understand X, and it died. Sometimes
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modelling things this way actually seems to make them easier to understand,
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perhaps because it's instinctively natural to think of anything with a
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really complex behavioral repertoire as like a person rather than like a
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thing. At first glance, to anyone who understands how these programs
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actually work, this seems like an absurdity. As hackers are among the people
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who know best how these phenomena work, it seems odd that they would use
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language that seems to ascribe consciousness to them. The mind-set behind
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this tendency thus demands examination. The key to understanding this kind
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of usage is that it isn't done in a naive way; hackers don't personalize
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their stuff in the sense of feeling empathy with it, nor do they mystically
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believe that the things they work on every day are alive. To the contrary:
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hackers who anthropomorphize are expressing not a vitalistic view of program
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behavior but a mechanistic view of human behavior. Almost all hackers
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subscribe to the mechanistic, materialistic ontology of science (this is in
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practice true even of most of the minority with contrary religious
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theories). In this view, people are biological machines consciousness is an
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interesting and valuable epiphenomenon, but mind is implemented in machinery
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which is not fundamentally different in information-processing capacity from
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computers. Hackers tend to take this a step further and argue that the
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difference between a substrate of CHON atoms and water and a substrate of
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silicon and metal is a relatively unimportant one; what matters, what makes
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a thing alive, is information and richness of pattern. This is animism from
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the flip side; it implies that humans and computers and dolphins and rocks
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are all machines exhibiting a continuum of modes of consciousness according
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to their information-processing capacity. Because hackers accept that a
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human machine can have intentions, it is therefore easy for them to ascribe
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consciousness and intention to other complex patterned systems such as
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computers. If consciousness is mechanical, it is neither more or less absurd
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to say that The program wants to go into an infinite loop than it is to
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say that I want to go eat some chocolate and even defensible to say that
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The stone, once dropped, wants to move towards the center of the earth .
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This viewpoint has respectable company in academic philosophy. Daniel
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Dennett organizes explanations of behavior using three stances: the
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physical stance (thing-to-be-explained as a physical object), the design
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stance (thing-to-be-explained as an artifact), and the intentional stance
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(thing-to-be-explained as an agent with desires and intentions). Which
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stances are appropriate is a matter not of abstract truth but of utility.
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Hackers typically view simple programs from the design stance, but more
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complex ones are often modelled using the intentional stance. It has also
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been argued that the anthropomorphization of software and hardware reflects
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a blurring of the boundary between the programmer and his artifacts the
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human qualities belong to the programmer and the code merely expresses these
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qualities as his/her proxy. On this view, a hacker saying a piece of code
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got confused is really saying that he (or she) was confused about exactly
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what he wanted the computer to do, the code naturally incorporated this
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confusion, and the code expressed the programmer's confusion when executed
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by crashing or otherwise misbehaving. Note that by displacing from I got
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confused to It got confused, the programmer is not avoiding
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responsibility, but rather getting some analytical distance in order to be
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able to consider the bug dispassionately. It has also been suggested that
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anthropomorphizing complex systems is actually an expression of humility, a
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way of acknowleging that simple rules we do understand (or that we invented)
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can lead to emergent behavioral complexities that we don't completely
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understand. All three explanations accurately model hacker psychology, and
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should be considered complementary rather than competing.
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