diff --git a/shells/rssh/Makefile b/shells/rssh/Makefile
index 450df45ab204..85feb2e79a66 100644
--- a/shells/rssh/Makefile
+++ b/shells/rssh/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 
 PORTNAME=	rssh
 PORTVERSION=	2.3.4
-PORTREVISION=	1
+PORTREVISION=	2
 CATEGORIES=	shells security
 MASTER_SITES=	SF
 
diff --git a/shells/rssh/files/optional-patch-util.c b/shells/rssh/files/optional-patch-util.c
index 718b7654ac5c..146e48f1d33b 100644
--- a/shells/rssh/files/optional-patch-util.c
+++ b/shells/rssh/files/optional-patch-util.c
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
---- util.c.orig	2012-11-27 12:14:49.000000000 +1100
-+++ util.c	2013-01-09 17:52:54.000000000 +1100
+Verifies the command line options for rysnc. This is an updated version that
+tightens the argument checking and requires to run rsync in server mode.
+Taken from Debian ("0007-Verify-rsync-command-options").
+--- util.c.orig	2012-11-27 01:14:49 UTC
++++ util.c
 @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
  #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
  #include <libgen.h>
@@ -8,18 +11,16 @@
  
  /* LOCAL INCLUDES */
  #include "pathnames.h"
-@@ -198,6 +199,73 @@
+@@ -198,6 +199,71 @@ bool check_command( char *cl, ShellOptions_t *opts, ch
  
  
  /*
-+ * rsync_e_okay() - take the command line passed to rssh and look for an -e
-+ *		    option.  If one is found, make sure --server is provided
-+ *		    and the option contains only the protocol information.
-+ *		    Also check for and reject any --rsh option.	 Returns FALSE
-+ *		    if the command line should not be allowed, TRUE if it is
-+ *		    okay.
++ * rsync_okay() - require --server on all rsh command lines, check that -e
++ *		  contains only protocol information, and reject any --rsh,
++ *		  --config, or --daemon option. Returns FALSE if the command
++ *		  line should not be allowed, TRUE if it is okay.
 + */
-+static int rsync_e_okay( char **vec )
++static int rsync_okay( char **vec )
 +{
 +	regex_t	re;
 +	int	server = FALSE;
@@ -48,18 +49,19 @@
 +	 * could be hidden from the server as an argument to some other
 +	 * option.
 +	 */
-+	if ( vec && vec[0] && vec[1] && strcmp(vec[1], "--server") == 0 ){
-+		server = TRUE;
-+	}
++	if ( !(vec && vec[0] && vec[1] && strcmp(vec[1], "--server") == 0) )
++		return FALSE;
 +
 +	/* Check the remaining options for -e or --rsh. */
 +	if ( regcomp(&re, pattern, REG_EXTENDED | REG_NOSUB) != 0 ){
 +		return FALSE;
 +	}
 +	while (vec && *vec){
-+		if ( strcmp(*vec, "--") == 0 ) break;
 +		if ( strcmp(*vec, "--rsh") == 0
-+		     || strncmp(*vec, "--rsh=", strlen("--rsh=")) == 0 ){
++		     || strcmp(*vec, "--daemon") == 0
++		     || strcmp(*vec, "--config") == 0
++		     || strncmp(*vec, "--rsh=", strlen("--rsh=")) == 0
++		     || strncmp(*vec, "--config=", strlen("--config=")) == 0 ){
 +			regfree(&re);
 +			return FALSE;
 +		}
@@ -73,7 +75,6 @@
 +		vec++;
 +	}
 +	regfree(&re);
-+	if ( e_found && !server ) return FALSE;
 +	return TRUE;
 +}
 +
@@ -82,10 +83,11 @@
   * check_command_line() - take the command line passed to rssh, and verify
   *			  that the specified command is one the user is
   *			  allowed to run and validate the arguments.  Return the
-@@ -230,14 +298,10 @@
+@@ -229,16 +295,27 @@ char *check_command_line( char **cl, ShellOptions_t *o
+ 	}
  
  	if ( check_command(*cl, opts, PATH_RSYNC, RSSH_ALLOW_RSYNC) ){
- 		/* filter -e option */
+-		/* filter -e option */
 -		if ( opt_filter(cl, 'e') ) return NULL;
 -		while (cl && *cl){
 -			if ( strstr(*cl, "--rsh" ) ){
@@ -94,10 +96,27 @@
 -				return NULL;
 -			}
 -			cl++;
-+		if ( !rsync_e_okay(cl) ){
-+			fprintf(stderr, "\ninsecure -e or --rsh option not allowed.");
-+			log_msg("insecure -e or --rsh option in rsync command line!");
++		if ( !rsync_okay(cl) ){
++			fprintf(stderr, "\ninsecure rsync options not allowed.");
++			log_msg("insecure rsync options in rsync command line!");
 +			return NULL;
  		}
++
++		/*
++		 * rsync is linked with popt, which recognizes a configuration
++		 * file ~/.popt that can, among other things, define aliases.
++		 * If someone can write to the home directory of the rssh
++		 * user, they can upload a ~/.popt file that contains
++		 * something like "rsync alias --server --rsh" and then
++		 * execute commands they upload.  popt does not try to read
++		 * its configuration file if HOME is not set, so unset HOME to
++		 * disable this behavior.
++		 */
++		if ( unsetenv("HOME") < 0 ){
++			log_msg("cannot unsetenv() HOME");
++			return NULL;
++		}
++
  		return PATH_RSYNC;
  	}
+ 	/* No match, return NULL */
diff --git a/shells/rssh/files/patch-log.c b/shells/rssh/files/patch-log.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..515c4a50b142
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shells/rssh/files/patch-log.c
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Workaround for basename(3) that is POSIX compliant since r308264 in FreeBSD 12
+--- log.c.orig	2012-11-27 00:25:13 UTC
++++ log.c
+@@ -93,10 +93,14 @@ char *log_make_ident( const char *name )
+ 	}
+ 	/* assign new value to ident from name */
+ 	if ( !name ) return (ident = NULL);
+-	ident = strdup(basename((char*)name));
+-	/* remove leading '-' from ident, if there is one */
+-	if ( ident[0] == '-' ){
+-		temp = strdup(ident + 1);
++	/* clone name in case basename() is POSIX-compliant */
++	temp = strdup ((char *) name);
++	/* always pass writeable string to basename() */
++	ident = strdup (basename (temp));
++	free (temp);
++	/* safely remove leading '-' from ident, if there is one */
++	if ((ident != NULL) && (ident[0] == '-')){
++		temp = strdup(&ident[1]);
+ 		free(ident);
+ 		ident = temp;
+ 	}
diff --git a/shells/rssh/files/patch-rssh__chroot__helper.c b/shells/rssh/files/patch-rssh__chroot__helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6688588aba9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shells/rssh/files/patch-rssh__chroot__helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+Workaround for basename(3) that is POSIX compliant since r308264 in FreeBSD 12
+
+Incorporates also a patch to check the command line after chroot. Taken from
+Debian ("0010-Check-command-line-after-chroot.patch")
+
+--- rssh_chroot_helper.c.orig	2006-12-21 22:22:35 UTC
++++ rssh_chroot_helper.c
+@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ int main( int argc, char **argv )
+ 	opts.chroot_path = NULL;
+ 
+ 	/* figure out our name, and give it to the log module */
+-	progname = strdup(log_make_ident(basename(argv[0])));
++	progname = strdup(log_make_ident(basename(strdup (argv[0]))));
+ 
+ 	/* get user's passwd info */
+ 	if ( (temp = getpwuid(getuid())) ){
+@@ -217,6 +217,12 @@ int main( int argc, char **argv )
+ 	if ( !(argvec = build_arg_vector(argv[2], 0)) )
+ 		ch_fatal_error("build_arg_vector()", argv[2],
+ 				"bad expansion");
++
++	/* check the command for safety */
++	if ( !check_command_line(argvec, &opts) ){
++		fprintf(stderr, "\n");
++		exit(1);
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* 
+ 	 * This is the old way to figure out what program to run.  Since we're
diff --git a/shells/rssh/files/patch-util.c b/shells/rssh/files/patch-util.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d99de13c1afd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shells/rssh/files/patch-util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+Workaround for basename(3) that is POSIX compliant since r308264 in FreeBSD 12
+
+Fixes buffer allocation for the fail message. Taken from Debian
+("0003-Fix-buffer-allocation-buffer-for-fail-message").
+
+Tightens the check for scp command line arguments that fixes also
+"CVE-2019-1000018". Taken from Debian ("0009-Verify-scp-command-options").
+Please note that with this patch the scp option "-3" can no longer be used.
+
+--- util.c.orig	2012-11-27 01:14:49 UTC
++++ util.c
+@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ void fail( int flags, int argc, char **argv )
+ 	/* create msg indicating what is allowed */
+ 	if ( !size ) cmd = "This user is locked out.";
+ 	else {
+-		size += 18;
++		size += 18 + 1;
+ 		if ( !(cmd = (char *)malloc(size)) ){
+ 			log_msg("fatal error: out of mem allocating log msg");
+ 			exit(1);
+@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ bool check_command( char *cl, ShellOptions_t *opts, ch
+ {
+ 	char	*prog;		/* basename of cmd */
+ 	char 	*tmp = cl;
++	char    *tmp2 = NULL;
+ 	bool	need_free = FALSE;
+ 	bool	rc = FALSE;
+ 	int 	i;
+@@ -186,11 +187,17 @@ bool check_command( char *cl, ShellOptions_t *opts, ch
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		/* compare tmp to cmd and prog for match */
+-		prog = basename(cmd);
++		tmp2 = strdup (cmd);
++		if (tmp2 == NULL) {
++			log_msg ("strdup() failed in check_command()");
++			return FALSE;
++		}
++		prog = basename(tmp2);
+ 		if ( !(strcmp(tmp, cmd)) || !(strcmp(tmp, prog))){
+ 			log_msg("cmd '%s' approved", prog);
+ 			rc = TRUE;
+ 		}	
++		free (tmp2);
+ 	}
+ 	if (need_free) free(tmp);
+ 	return rc;
+@@ -198,6 +205,43 @@ bool check_command( char *cl, ShellOptions_t *opts, ch
+ 
+ 
+ /*
++ * scp_okay() - take the command line and check that it is a hopefully-safe scp
++ *		server command line, accepting only very specific options.
++ *		Returns FALSE if the command line should not be allowed, TRUE
++ *		if it is okay.
++ */
++static int scp_okay( char **vec )
++{
++	int saw_f_or_t = FALSE;
++
++	for ( vec++; vec && *vec; vec++ ){
++		/* Allowed options. */
++		if ( strcmp(*vec, "-v") == 0 ) continue;
++		if ( strcmp(*vec, "-r") == 0 ) continue;
++		if ( strcmp(*vec, "-p") == 0 ) continue;
++		if ( strcmp(*vec, "-d") == 0 ) continue;
++		if ( strcmp(*vec, "-f") == 0 || strcmp(*vec, "-pf") == 0 ){
++			saw_f_or_t = TRUE;
++			continue;
++		}
++		if ( strcmp(*vec, "-t") == 0 || strcmp(*vec, "-pt") == 0 ){
++			saw_f_or_t = TRUE;
++			continue;
++		}
++
++		/* End of arguments. */
++		if ( strcmp(*vec, "--") == 0 ) break;
++
++		/* Any other argument is not allowed. */
++		if ( *vec[0] == '-' ) return FALSE;
++	}
++
++	/* Either -f or -t must have been given. */
++	return saw_f_or_t;
++}
++
++
++/*
+  * check_command_line() - take the command line passed to rssh, and verify
+  *			  that the specified command is one the user is
+  *			  allowed to run and validate the arguments.  Return the
+@@ -212,8 +256,11 @@ char *check_command_line( char **cl, ShellOptions_t *o
+ 		return PATH_SFTP_SERVER;
+ 
+ 	if ( check_command(*cl, opts, PATH_SCP, RSSH_ALLOW_SCP) ){
+-		/* filter -S option */
+-		if ( opt_filter(cl, 'S') ) return NULL;
++		if ( !scp_okay(cl) ){
++			fprintf(stderr, "\ninsecure scp option not allowed.");
++			log_msg("insecure scp option in scp command line");
++			return NULL;
++		}
+ 		return PATH_SCP;
+ 	}
+