People with huge contact lists most likely happen to have contacts starting with popular names more often.
They can use /msg Arthur to find the correct person.
But if they have 50 Arthurs it will take a while. Using the surname might be faster. So a substring search of /msg Clarke<tab> will be faster.
Fix https://github.com/profanity-im/profanity/issues/1984
`/url save $someurl` will now download to
`~/.local/share/profanity/downloads/from_jid/date/filename` instead of
`~/.local/share/profanity/downloads`.
Like this the downloaded files should be better ordered.
This will only happen for MUC and 1:1 chat windows.
Private windows might have only a nick or jid. Lets not distinguish
between those two ways. And since the nick option is unreliable to be
the same person lets just put them in the general downloads folder.
As is done with downloads from all other windows as well.
I also had the idea to make this configurable but this suits my needs
and time limits right now.
This reverts commit 3b099e9403.
This resulted in:
```
==5285== Invalid read of size 16
==5285== at 0x4FA80FC: ec_public_key_serialize (in /usr/lib64/libsignal-protocol-c.so.2.3.3)
==5285== by 0x4E5E76: omemo_identity_key (omemo.c:419)
==5285== by 0x4EBB7E: omemo_bundle_publish (omemo.c:129)
==5285== by 0x4E5BD9: omemo_publish_crypto_materials (omemo.c:335)
==5285== by 0x460407: sv_ev_connection_features_received (server_events.c:202)
==5285== by 0x43AA87: connection_features_received (connection.c:779)
==5285== by 0x4418C9: _disco_info_response_id_handler_onconnect (iq.c:2423)
==5285== by 0x43B9F1: _iq_handler (iq.c:241)
==5285== by 0x5163848: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libstrophe.so.0.13.1)
==5285== by 0x516A224: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libstrophe.so.0.13.1)
==5285== by 0x5E4FE43: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libxml2.so.2.12.8)
==5285== by 0x5E54927: xmlParseChunk (in /usr/lib64/libxml2.so.2.12.8)
==5285== by 0x5163450: xmpp_run_once (in /usr/lib64/libstrophe.so.0.13.1)
==5285== by 0x439797: connection_check_events (connection.c:162)
==5285== by 0x43894E: session_process_events (session.c:256)
==5285== by 0x4319FF: prof_run (profanity.c:128)
==5285== by 0x4EDAE6: main (main.c:174)
==5285== Address 0xa1cb1e0 is 16 bytes inside a block of size 72 free'd
==5285== at 0x484875B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5285== by 0x4395D0: _xfree (connection.c:110)
==5285== by 0x516A1A7: xmpp_stanza_release (in /usr/lib64/libstrophe.so.0.13.1)
==5285== by 0x516A16C: xmpp_stanza_release (in /usr/lib64/libstrophe.so.0.13.1)
==5285== by 0x516A16C: xmpp_stanza_release (in /usr/lib64/libstrophe.so.0.13.1)
==5285== by 0x516A230: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libstrophe.so.0.13.1)
==5285== by 0x5E4FE43: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libxml2.so.2.12.8)
==5285== by 0x5E54927: xmlParseChunk (in /usr/lib64/libxml2.so.2.12.8)
==5285== by 0x5163450: xmpp_run_once (in /usr/lib64/libstrophe.so.0.13.1)
==5285== by 0x439797: connection_check_events (connection.c:162)
==5285== by 0x43894E: session_process_events (session.c:256)
==5285== by 0x4319FF: prof_run (profanity.c:128)
==5285== by 0x4EDAE6: main (main.c:174)
==5285== Block was alloc'd at
==5285== at 0x4845794: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5285== by 0x43958A: _xmalloc (connection.c:102)
==5285== by 0x516A0D1: xmpp_stanza_new (in /usr/lib64/libstrophe.so.0.13.1)
==5285== by 0x516BF34: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libstrophe.so.0.13.1)
==5285== by 0x5F10A17: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libxml2.so.2.12.8)
==5285== by 0x5E5481F: xmlParseChunk (in /usr/lib64/libxml2.so.2.12.8)
==5285== by 0x5163450: xmpp_run_once (in /usr/lib64/libstrophe.so.0.13.1)
==5285== by 0x439797: connection_check_events (connection.c:162)
==5285== by 0x43894E: session_process_events (session.c:256)
==5285== by 0x4319FF: prof_run (profanity.c:128)
==5285== by 0x4EDAE6: main (main.c:174)
```
Tested via sending OMEMO messages via 1:1 and in MUC.
When a user added an account, set it as autoconnect and then removed
that account. It still was set as the autoconnect account.
```
/account add test
/autoconnect set test
/account remove test
/save
/quit
Start profanity
```
Fix https://github.com/profanity-im/profanity/issues/1976
libsignal does this properly, so there wouldn't be a real double free, but
it will `abort()`.
Instead of destroying the identity key on disconnect, already destroy it
after it has been put into the libsignal 'ratchet identity key pair'.
In the case where the key pair is initially generated, the public
and private parts are only `ref()`'ed once in [0].
In the case where the key pair is read from the disk, the public
and private parts are `ref()`'ed twice, first when decoded in [1] resp.
[2] and a second time in [3].
When `omemo_on_disconnect()` is called we were `unref()`'ing the parts
twice, before this patch. First in [4], a second time in [5] resp. [6].
Now we do the second `unref()` already when loading.
[0] `signal_protocol_key_helper_generate_identity_key_pair()`
[1] `curve_decode_point()`
[2] `curve_decode_private_point()`
[3] `ratchet_identity_key_pair_create()`
[4] `ratchet_identity_key_pair_destroy()`
[5] `ec_private_key_destroy()`
[6] `ec_public_key_destroy()`
Signed-off-by: Steffen Jaeckel <jaeckel-floss@eyet-services.de>
When using `/statusbar tabmode actlist` and `/statusbar self user` then we get `[00:23] [user]` and now `[00:23] [1:user]` where `1` is the active tab. The active tab is only displayed with fulljid.
This commit fixes 7d290b04d.
Fix https://github.com/profanity-im/profanity/issues/1980
This lets users use the actlist and decide if they want to see name or
numbers.
The old behaviour can be achieved with:
```
/statusbar hide read
/statusbar hide name
/statusbar show number
/statusbar tabmode actlist
```
Fix https://github.com/profanity-im/profanity/issues/1974
When users receive a message and a subscription request from a new
contact, and they use `/blocked report-abse JID` or `/blocked
report-spam JID` they most likely want the subscription request to
vanish as well.
According to mdosch Conversations is behaving like this too.
Fix: https://github.com/profanity-im/profanity/issues/1970
## Summary
Partial fix for https://github.com/profanity-im/profanity/issues/1939
> When doing the same in an unencrypted (no e2ee) chat there is no Downloading… message at all but the file is downloaded.
Download a file twice with `/url save`, the second download will not print download progress to the window.
The cause is `HTTPDownload`'s `silent` variable is not initialized; so, `silent` points to a second-hand stack memory address with old data. `silent` references data, so the `if` statement will fail in **src/tools/http_download.c:206** and download progress will not print to the window.
The fix is to initialize `silent` in both encrypted and unencrypted file download scenarios.
## Testing
Valgrind: Yes
- `/url save` without OMEMO
**SUCCESS**: Try three times with the same URL and download status will display every time.
- `/url save` with OMEMO
**SUCCESS**: Try three times with the same URL and download status will display every time.
- `/plugins install https://raw.githubusercontent.com/profanity-im/profanity-plugins/master/stable/sounds.py`
**SUCCESS**: Try once and download progress is hidden.
Revert "Merge pull request #1943 from H3rnand3zzz/gmainloop
This reverts commit 609fde0998, reversing
changes made to 2ec94064ed.
Revert "Merge pull request #1948 from H3rnand3zzz/fix/rl-less-refreshes"
This reverts commit 11762fd2b0, reversing
changes made to 609fde0998.
We have got several issues, that we don't quite see how to solve, with
the merge of the gmainloop PR.
* Slashguard is broken (#1955) (though #1956 could fix that)
* One person reported problems with copy paste selection via mouse
* Some input buffer seems not to be cleared correctly
It happened that I was debugging profanity used `/connect` and typed
the password. I then debugged so long that a time out occurred, so
profanity disconnected. Then it printed "unknown command: $password".
There was something else that I forgot now.
Bottomline is: so far we didn't get it right so we will undo these
changes until someone proposes a working solution.
We got a slight performance increase (apparently noticable when
alt+mouse scrolling) but got too many issues with this change.
When user was scrolling down using alt + mouse wheel/arrows, he would be
stuck in most of the cases after the buffer finishes
due to the part of code that moves the "cursor" up to show full last page.
New algorithm considers close to border cursor as passing for
DB loading condition,
at the same time it calculates offset, allowing flexible scroll size.
The problem was introduced by @H3rnand3zzz in the following commit:
23692fedff
The redisplay function in keyboard handling event was introduced by @rodarima
in the following commit:
7eac636fc8
At the point first commit introduction it made sense, but later
the following commit added proper handling of input redisplay.
ccede06a65
This change was overlooked by me and introduced in #1943.
Potential solution for #1947.
Feature discovery was marked as finished once we received a reply to the
initial request. The discovery mechanism allows to delegate the real
feature discovery to another service running on different domain and those
requests are created dynamically.
This was another instance causing the warning message described in #1940Fixes#1940 (once more)
Signed-off-by: Steffen Jaeckel <jaeckel-floss@eyet-services.de>
Before there was a problem of overscrolling:
when messages longer than y axis of the terminal are fetched from the DB,
profanity scroll "jumps" to the top, skipping some messages.
It's resolved by keeping messages' starting and ending line in the
internal profanity buffer, which allows to track proper message positions
and to adjust window position accordingly.
Message size is now tracked as part of the buffer's record in `_line`
variable, which allows calculation of the total buffer size, which
might be a part of the improved solution for the "underscrolling" problem,
if we are going to limit profanity's buffer size by amount of lines as
opposed to the limitation based on the amount of message which is currently
used.
Before adding a limitation by amount of lines, careful consideration is
required, as some users don't use history and their temporary message
history can be cut to minimal limit because of 1 long received/sent message.
Underscrolling problem was fixed in a previous commit
d7e46d64fe
Short recap of the problem:
Despite user scrolling to top/bottom of history,
factual position is offset from the intended location
Another feature of this commit is a minor change which adds fetching
message stanza IDs from the DB. It allows correcting messages
fetched from history.
Fixes https://github.com/profanity-im/profanity/issues/1934
