From 6450e2a704c6ed13ec8e5d26d7e5cf933ad00c61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: lightb <lightb@bigfoot>
Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2014 16:01:57 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Added OTR opportunistic pattern intercept.

When a message is received, OTRL_MESSAGE_TAG_BASE + OTRL_MESSAGE_TAG_V1 or OTRL_MESSAGE_TAG_V2
is searched for, if it is, the client attempts to start an OTR session.

Tested between profanity clients: WORKED
Tested between profanity and pidgin: NOT WORKING (not sure if pidgin checks for the whitespace)
---
 src/server_events.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/server_events.c b/src/server_events.c
index afb29bcd..0d0ba9c6 100644
--- a/src/server_events.c
+++ b/src/server_events.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 
 #ifdef HAVE_LIBOTR
 #include "otr/otr.h"
+#include <libotr/proto.h>
 #endif
 
 #include "ui/ui.h"
@@ -205,6 +206,17 @@ void
 handle_incoming_message(char *from, char *message, gboolean priv)
 {
 #ifdef HAVE_LIBOTR
+//check for OTR whitespace (opportunistic)
+    char *policy = prefs_get_string(PREF_OTR_POLICY);
+    if (strcmp(policy, "opportunistic") == 0) {
+	if (strstr(message,OTRL_MESSAGE_TAG_BASE)) {
+		if (strstr(message, OTRL_MESSAGE_TAG_V2) || strstr(message, OTRL_MESSAGE_TAG_V1)) {
+        		char *otr_query_message = otr_start_query();
+			cons_show("OTR Whitespace pattern detected. Attempting to start OTR session...", message);
+        		message_send(otr_query_message, from);
+			}
+		}
+	}
     gboolean was_decrypted = FALSE;
     char *newmessage;
     if (!priv) {